NATO’s top naval commanders and operators recently gathered to discuss how to sustain and further develop the alliance’s maritime operational advantage.
This long-standing advantage is under pressure, especially in the underwater realm, due to increasing Russian naval capability and activity. Generally, Russia’s naval development remains unchecked despite the slow progress of the country’s war in Ukraine.
In mid-April, at its Northwood, UK headquarters, NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) – the alliance’s ‘hub’ for maritime forces, operations, and information sharing – hosted its annual Maritime Operational Commanders’ Conference (MOCC). Participants included navy chiefs, fleet commanders, operational directors, and other senior leaders and planners from various NATO commands, including the three Joint Force Commands (Brunssum, Naples, and Norfolk) and Allied Command Operations.
In a statement, MARCOM said, “The annual event is designed to foster open discussion and dialogue about how the alliance can strengthen its warfighting advantage.”
“We live in consequential times, and in an era of great power competition marked by rapid technological change and sophisticated and adaptive adversaries,” Vice Admiral Robert Pedre, a UK Royal Navy officer recently appointed as MARCOM’s Commander, said in the statement. “Maritime power remains foundational to NATO’s collective defence, security, and prosperity, serving as a critical domain for deterring adversaries.”
This year, the MOCC discussions centred on the future of NATO’s standing naval forces (SNFs). Currently, there are four SNFs: the North Atlantic-focused Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) and Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group 1 (SNMCMG1), and the Mediterranean-focused SNMG2 and SNMCMG2. The force structure of the SNMGs is primarily based on destroyers and frigates; naturally, the core platforms of the SNMCMGs are naval mine warfare vessels.
“This year’s MOCC primarily centred on NATO’s SNFs, recognising their vital and lasting contribution to allied deterrence as we face an increasingly challenging maritime landscape,” said Vice Adm Pedre. Countries contributing forces to the SNFs clearly demonstrate the alliance’s cohesion and resolve, he added.
Public discussions about the future of the SNFs have covered several issues, including: how to maintain their occupancy (ideally with around four or five ships in each group at all times) when member state navies have other national commitments; whether there are options to increase the number of SNFs (for example, perhaps by adding a third SNMG focused on the Arctic/High North); and ways to more fully integrate maritime uncrewed systems (MUS) into the SNFs, including the possibility of establishing an SNF composed solely of MUS.
Immediately after the Russo-Ukraine war erupted in February 2022, the SNFs were elevated to be high-readiness maritime task forces, providing the naval component of the alliance’s very high readiness joint operational outputs.
The MARCOM statement highlighted that the conference addressed the necessity to further improve operational experimentation and the integration of MUS into alliance maritime operations.
The statement also mentioned that other focus areas during the conference discussions included further enhancing alliance maritime information sharing, MARCOM’s evolving role as a warfighting headquarters, and maintaining high levels of naval operational readiness across NATO’s area of responsibility, including preparations for short-notice contingencies.
The extent of the challenge to NATO caused by the increasing strategic instability across the Euro-Atlantic theatre is reflected in the rising number of maritime-related enhanced vigilance activities (EVAs) being carried out by the alliance across the region. These include ‘Neptune Strike’, which combines carrier strike group (CSG) capabilities and is conducted in the Mediterranean and North Seas; ‘Baltic Sentry’, which aims to generate surveillance, presence, and deterrence against threats to critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) in the Baltic region; and ‘Arctic Sentry’, which is establishing deterrence presence around the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap and further into the Arctic/High North region.
by Dr. Lee Willett
