News broke Tuesday that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is planning to order the elimination of one-fifth of the U.S. military’s general and flag billets. There is a legitimate case for examining whether the Armed Forces have have become too top-heavy. There is also a legitimate reason to be concerned about how reductions in the senior officer corps are carried out.
For more than 20 years, I worked as a federal contractor operating mission-critical facilities supporting the Defense Department, State Department, and federal law-enforcement agencies. That experience gave me an appreciation for something that can be difficult to quantify on an organizational chart: institutional knowledge.
Large organizations accumulate layers of management. The military is not immune. Headquarters expand, responsibilities overlap, and positions created to meet one requirement sometimes remain long after circumstances change.
Congress recognized this issue well before the current administration. In 2017, lawmakers reduced the authorized number of active-duty general and flag officer positions by about 11 percent. They also ordered a comprehensive look at whether another 10 percent of flag jobs might be cut, and if so, which ones.
This is important context for today’s debate: concern about “rank creep” did not suddenly appear in 2025, nor is questioning the number of generals and admirals inherently an attack on military leadership. It is a legitimate management and national-security question.
But it is only the beginning of the analysis.
In May 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed a minimum 20 percent reduction in active-component four-star positions, a minimum 20 percent reduction in National Guard general officers, and an additional minimum 10 percent reduction in general and flag officers associated with restructuring the Unified Command Plan. That order came amid broader cuts to the defense civilian workforce, a campaign noted for a lack of planning and consequent disruption.
Hegseth’s new order to cut 20 percent of general and flag billets reportedly comes with a similarly tight deadline: Jan. 1.
The question Congress and the American public should be asking is not simply, “How many generals can we eliminate?” It should be: Which positions does the military need to accomplish its mission, and what happens when those positions and the officers who fill them disappear?
There is an enormous difference between eliminating an unnecessary headquarters position and losing an experienced operational commander. There is a difference between removing a redundant layer of administration and disrupting the succession of officers being prepared for increasingly demanding commands. And there is a difference between making an organization leaner and simply making it smaller.
The men and women who reach the senior ranks of our Armed Forces generally arrive there after decades of increasingly demanding assignments. The combined operational, technical, and institutional experience represented by those officers is an asset that cannot quickly or easily be replaced.
That does not mean every general or admiral billet should be preserved. If a headquarters is unnecessary, eliminate it. If two commands unnecessarily duplicate one another, consolidate them. If a position no longer requires a general or flag officer, downgrade it. If layers of bureaucracy interfere with getting resources and authority to the people actually performing the mission, remove those layers.
But make those decisions based upon the requirements of the mission—not simply the desire to achieve a predetermined percentage reduction.
The same principle should apply farther down the ranks. A serious examination of military “rank creep” should not stop with four-star generals. Congress should examine the entire personnel structure and determine whether the balance among general and flag officers, field-grade officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and the junior enlisted personnel who perform much of the military’s day-to-day operational work remains appropriate for today’s force.
The answer may differ considerably among the services. A Navy built around technologically complex ships, submarines and aviation cannot necessarily be evaluated using the same personnel ratios as an Army ground formation. Cyber, space, intelligence and nuclear missions also require experienced technical personnel. That is precisely why percentage reductions alone are an inadequate substitute for manpower analysis.
There is another consequence that deserves attention: the effect on the officers who remain. If capable and deserving officers come to believe that opportunities for advancement are disappearing for reasons unrelated to their performance, qualifications or the needs of the service, the consequences can extend far beyond the officers whose promotions are affected. It can influence retention, morale and the willingness of talented younger officers to commit their careers to military service.
Promotion and command decisions should be based upon merit and military requirements, without regard to sex, ethnicity or orientation. The objective should be straightforward: identify and advance the most capable people required to defend the country.
Congress therefore has an important oversight responsibility. It should determine which senior positions are actually being eliminated, which are merely being left vacant or reassigned, whether the positions involve administrative or operational responsibilities, what effect the changes have on succession and readiness, and how today’s reductions compare with the reforms Congress itself initiated nearly a decade ago.
Lawmakers should also ask a deceptively simple question: Did the FY2017 reforms work?
If Congress previously ordered substantial reductions and today’s Defense Department again concludes that the senior ranks are excessive, policymakers should understand why. Were the earlier reductions implemented as intended? Did new headquarters and billets subsequently replace those eliminated? Did missions change? Or does the underlying personnel system itself encourage rank growth? Those answers matter.
We should streamline the military where the evidence supports doing so. Every dollar and every billet consumed by unnecessary overhead is a resource unavailable to the warfighter. But efficiency cannot be measured simply by counting how many stars have disappeared from an organizational chart. We should not endeavor to achieve a managerial statistic by dulling the point of the spear and sacrificing the careers of dedicated members of our Armed Forces.
James Jacobson spent more than 20 years as a federal contractor operating mission-critical facilities supporting the Department of Defense, Department of State, and federal law-enforcement agencies. He lives in Naples, Florida.
