Assessing a threat model in which malicious actors leverage large language model (LLM) agents to exploit biological tools (BTs), the authors evaluate whether agents can lower expertise barriers for hazardous biodesign. They find that LLM agents demonstrate emerging ability to use BTs for nucleic acid synthesis screening evasion, although success is inconsistent and model safeguards frequently limit testing of closed-weight systems.
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