The Army’s recently released operational warfighting guidance introduces an updated organizing construct designed to drive institutional change and guide resourcing decisions across the force. The document’s central idea emphasizes four elements of landpower: convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance. All four are essential—particularly, as the guidance notes, when “integrated together.” But one element, endurance, presents the greatest challenge.
The guidance, titled “How the Army Fights” (HTAF), says that endurance “postures, protects, and projects combat power over time, distance, and contested conditions through resilient sustainment and force generation.” It designates theater armies, corps, and their enabling commands as echelons responsible for endurance across the force, and cites pre-positioned stocks, access agreements, installations, and the industrial base as crucial components of endurance. Framing endurance in this way—primarily as a theater-setting activity—represents a foundational approach. However, endurance must also be applied at the tactical level, where Army formations will need to confront the grueling reality of modern large-scale combat operations against determined peer adversaries.
HTAF accurately diagnoses the problem, stating that “a protracted peer war will consume the ready force faster than any recent conflict, and force generation will shift from a readiness cycle to a wartime campaign.” The crucial next step is to extend endurance beyond the theater level by applying it to the divisions and brigades fighting the close battle. Against an adversary that can absorb losses and continue fighting, tactical formations will need to win the close battle repeatedly, shifting between maneuver and attrition as conditions change. In practice, this means adapting existing cognitive approaches like operational art to the maneuver-attrition cycle and revitalizing reconstitution as a tactical and operational competency.
Beyond the First Fight
Tactical endurance will determine how many times divisions and brigades can win the close battle against a determined and resilient opposing force. Without it, Army formations are betting that they will win a decisive first battle that results in the adversary’s annihilation or capitulation. But history reveals that achieving rapid decision through wars of maneuver is rare to the point of being an illusion. The challenges of the current operational environment include increased transparency, enhanced lethal strike capabilities, and rapid adaptation cycles. These challenges compress time, making fast and relatively bloodless wars of maneuver unlikely. The vital mindset shift within Army institutional culture is therefore one that accepts maneuver not as the opposite of attrition but as complementary to and benefiting from attritional approaches within protracted conflicts. In practice, this shift will help planners think beyond just winning the crucial first fight to account for extended campaigns.
Attrition does not inherently signal a failure of operational art or an absence of professional competence. In the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Ukrainian military has implemented a destruction-focused attritional approach to stymie Russian advances by raising the costs of mobility and concentration required for maneuver. Ukraine’s stated goal is to impose up to two hundred Russian casualties for every square kilometer the Russian Army seizes. In recent months, Ukrainian forces have reclaimed significant territory in Donetsk Oblast through Operation Vivaldi, taking advantage of fleeting windows of time when conditions are set for increased mobility on the battlefield. Vivaldi has followed on the heels of almost two years of attritional fighting that has steadily depleted the Russian Army. For the US Army, Operation Vivaldi should enhance the understanding of the utility of attrition as a means to sustain campaigns and set conditions for successive operations. This does not mean the Army must embrace attrition as its preferred warfighting approach; it simply acknowledges that land forces must endure through extended campaigns by maneuvering when conditions allow and by transitioning to more sustainable methods to maintain pressure on the adversary while balancing destruction and protection.
Applying Operational Art to the Maneuver-Attrition Cycle
If the Army accepts that the first fight will not always be decisive, then doctrine and organizational planning mechanisms will need to follow suit. In future large-scale combat operations, success may depend less on committing to maneuver or attrition as distinct warfighting approaches than on effectively transitioning between the two to sustain operations of scope, scale, and duration. Doctrine already acknowledges that a “combination of maneuver and attrition is typically necessary to achieve victory during armed conflict,” but provides no answer for how to mix them effectively.
Operational art can provide a useful basis from which to sustain Army forces engaged in high-intensity conflict for extended periods. Concepts like tempo, culmination, risk, and phasing provide core planning mechanisms to plan transitions between maneuver and attrition. The lingering gap is that these concepts are not meaningfully connected into a framework for commanders and staffs to determine when the utility of maneuver or attrition will expire. Tactical endurance therefore requires the application of operational art to anticipate deliberate transitions between maneuver and attrition within protracted campaigns.
Tempo and culmination are two planning tools that help staffs judge when to push, when to slow down, and when to transition between maneuver and attrition. In a maneuver-focused operation, controlling tempo provides a force with a mechanism to maintain the initiative over an adversary. Staffs assist commanders with balancing speed against operational reach and execute sustainment planning to ensure forces can consolidate gains and maintain freedom of movement. By contrast, an attritional operation’s tempo may be measured by relative expenditure of key resources, offering staffs a way to analyze whether an adversary is being destroyed faster than friendly forces. More importantly, measuring attritional tempo may offer projections about which side is more likely to culminate first based on rates of exchange, giving commanders a risk-informed basis for decisions about mobility and force protection.
Similarly, analyzing the relative potential for culmination may provide staffs with a practical guide for planning transitions between maneuver- and attrition-focused approaches. A maneuver-focused phase may conclude due to physical or psychological factors, cueing a shift to a more sustainable phase in which forces impose destruction on adversary forces while protecting their own. Staffs may use the combination of tempo and culmination to make maneuver-attrition cycles repeatable, generating the tactical endurance required to confront the challenges of large-scale combat operations.
While navigating maneuver-attrition cycles, commanders and staffs will need to continually assess their subordinate formations for physical and psychological fatigue. As units fight, move, protect themselves, and expend resources in extended campaigns, corps and theater army staffs will need to plan and execute effective reconstitution operations to keep their subordinate elements in the fight.
Rebuilding While Fighting
HTAF says that “installations require enduring force generation platforms and industrial-scale capacity to mobilize forces rapidly and reconstitute from peer or near-peer attrition in war.” Although these factors are crucial, reconstitution is not just a force generation problem that relies on institutional factors. It is also a tactical and operational competency, involving assessment, reorganization, regeneration, and management of forces over time while remaining engaged in continuous combat operations. Assessment requires judgements about what formations can accomplish in lethal environments where losses are inevitable and psychological factors play a role. Reorganization refers to the practice of internally reallocating resources, including people and equipment, to offset combat losses. Regeneration represents the most direct link to reconstitution’s force generation factors mentioned in HTAF. It involves rebuilding formations with people and equipment newly arrived to the theater. Corps formations will need to effectively manage the assessment-reorganization-regeneration cycle to provide divisions the flexibility to focus on defeating enemy forces in the close battle. Concurrently, theater armies may act as the conduit between their subordinate formations and the mobilization installations and training base in the United States, shepherding mobilized personnel and equipment to their destination. Executing effective reconstitution operations will create tactical endurance through grueling maneuver-attrition cycles, ensuring that Army forces rebuild faster than an adversary.
Reinvigorating reconstitution means contending with its inherent challenges in the future operational environment. Assessment will require a combination of art and science, as commanders make value judgments about their subordinate formations while staffs measure losses quantitatively. Losing key leaders, soldiers, and equipment will produce real physical vulnerabilities that are compounded by the psychological effects of contemporary combat’s brutal conditions. Soldiers in Ukraine have reported that the constant threat of destruction in the kill zone can produce enough battlefield fatigue to make units inoperable, degrading their ability to execute complex operations or maneuver.
Executing reorganization through the reallocation of internal resources will require what HTAF refers to as “tactical concealment and robust deception.” Moving forces within the tactical zones and rear areas to reinforce degraded units will incur risk in an environment filled with sensors connected to lethal effects. Increased battlefield transparency will also affect the ability to regenerate, as adversary effects reach deep into rear areas to strike newly generated personnel and equipment moving into the area of operations. Executing reconstitution operations ultimately represents one of the most crucial elements of endurance for Army forces. It ensures Army formations retain the capacity and capability to remain viable as fighting organizations in the most challenging of operational environments.
Roadblocks and Challenges
One significant roadblock to embracing, or at least accepting, maneuver-attrition cycles is in the cognitive space, where maneuver warfare lore dominates institutional narratives. The Army’s calling card has been to act as the arm of decision for the joint force by creating positions of advantage and exploiting those positions on land through maneuver warfare. This can and should remain the Army’s core capability. But the service will need to evolve its thinking by acknowledging that conditions for executing operational maneuver are fleeting, and that future wars will require formations that can survive and endure to win the close battle as higher echelons set conditions through convergence and strike.
The stark reality of current Army force structure combined with budgetary constraints presents wicked challenges for the Army’s tactical endurance gap. The Army, and the joint force as a whole, has built a force that revolves around reducing the historical need for mass through high-technology weaponry and standoff systems. These decisions were logical at the time but now place the Army in a tenuous position as it observes the Russo-Ukrainian War and considers the challenges inherent in future large-scale combat operations. This trend appears to be continuing, as HTAF states that operational brigades will be “leaner, more lethal and optimized for rapid dispersion.” Consumption rates in Ukraine are truly alarming and raise vexing questions about the Army’s capacity to endure through high-intensity conflict. Even if Army leaders decide that the force must meet the tactical endurance gap by growing more brigades and divisions, force structure expansion will not occur overnight.
In the meantime, the Army will need to take bite-sized chunks of the problem. Updating doctrine—including reconstitution operations doctrine that was published nine months before the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War—will enable staffs to consider how operational art can be applied to plan crucial transitions in the maneuver-attrition cycle. Planning for the maneuver-attrition cycle will require considerations for reconstitution to ensure tactical formations maintain tempo while balancing mobility and protection.
Nobody should wish for the type of fighting being witnessed in Ukraine. An extended, attritional conflict would impose severe costs on the Army’s force structure, which does not currently contain the capacity to fight this kind of conflict. However, preparing for war requires confronting the realities of war. An adversary that is well-resourced, modernized, and motivated will simply choose to keep fighting even when confronted with localized, tactical defeat. The current and future operational environment lends itself less to a rapid war of maneuver and more to a long struggle characterized by maneuver-attrition cycles.
The Army is in a unique position to address the tactical endurance gap as it operationalizes HTAF and enacts radical change to enhance warfighting across the force. True endurance requires both theater-setting activities to guarantee forces will be sustained and tactical considerations to ensure formations prevent culmination by navigating the maneuver-attrition cycles inherent in high-intensity conflict. In other words, tactical endurance will enable Army formations to transcend a focus on winning battles into one designed for winning wars.
Jay Pasquarette is an Army officer. He and his family are stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. Sam Shomento, US Army

