WASHINGTON—When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled her plans for a new European Security Strategy in January, she cited “geopolitical changes.” Even then, that was a considerable understatement.
In the west, US President Donald Trump was escalating his pressure campaign over Greenland and threatening to seize a European ally’s territory by force. In the east, Russia—emboldened by a lack of Western financial backing for Kyiv—was gearing up for another spring offensive in Ukraine.
Fast-forward four months, and the “geopolitical changes” closing in on the continent have only multiplied—from the economic repercussions of the Iran war to several US force posture decisions that have raised fresh doubts about the Trump administration’s commitment to NATO. And with these changes, the upcoming European Security Strategy has taken on even greater urgency.
Set to be released after the NATO Summit, the framework is expected to shape the European Union’s (EU’s) policy response to the security challenges at hand. It won’t, however, be a cure-all for Europe’s strategic deficiencies. Nor will it transform the bloc into the security actor it needs to be. Only sustained, meaningful action will.
The EU has been here before
The upcoming European Security Strategy is not the first time that the EU has attempted to articulate its defense and security priorities. The bloc has produced similar strategic plans before, such as the Strategic Compass, the EU’s first white paper on defense. Published in 2022, just weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it lays out four key pillars to transform Europe into a credible security actor by 2030: act, secure, invest, and partner. The Strategic Compass makes the case for coordinating investments in Europe’s security rather than pursuing fragmented national approaches.
In 2025, the European Commission also published the White Paper on the Future for European Defense Readiness 2030. Building on its ReArm Europe Plan, the document outlines how the EU can assume a larger role in defense—and how it can enable industry to produce rapidly and efficiently, while facilitating the swift deployment of troops and military assets across the continent. Backed by an €800 billion increase in defense funding, this roadmap relies on offering greater financial flexibility to EU member states.
Yet both the Strategic Compass and the White Paper remain partial responses: The first focused on defense coordination, the second on industrial readiness. What neither provides is a single, overarching framework to define Europe’s defense priorities in a rapidly deteriorating security environment—one that fuses threat assessment, defense policy, and geopolitical posture into a coherent strategy.
Defending the continent—and stabilizing the neighborhood
The new European Security Strategy can fill this gap. However, it will only truly succeed if it addresses two major questions that have so far remained unanswered. First, how should the EU rethink and rebuild a continental security architecture that Russia has steadily eroded? Second, how can the bloc become a more influential actor in its broader neighborhood and take on a stabilizing role in the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa?
With respect to the first question, the strategy should articulate how the EU can assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense, without relying on the US as the continent’s security guarantor. As outlined in the 2026 US National Defense Strategy, the United States will likely provide “critical but more limited” support going forward. As transatlantic cooperation becomes increasingly transactional—particularly in areas such as arms sales, industrial collaboration, and intelligence sharing—the EU will need to define how it intends to sustain credible deterrence and defense capabilities while achieving greater strategic autonomy.
Against this background, the strategy should also double down on supporting Ukraine’s defense—both through bilateral and EU channels, as well as through the Coalition of the Willing—and on strengthening the European pillar of NATO in close coordination with partners like the United Kingdom, Norway, and Turkey. After all, a failure to provide Kyiv with the support it requires to defend itself and deter further Russian aggression would significantly increase future costs to European security. Though Russia has recently lost ground in its war against Ukraine for the first time since summer 2024, it still possesses significant strategic advantages vis-à-vis Europe—from its vast stockpiles of hydrocarbons and defense materiel to its war economy and nuclear arsenal.
With regard to the second question—how to make the EU a stabilizing force in its neighborhood—the European Security Strategy should similarly aim at greater European independence from the United States. Since the Trump administration’s stance on what it wants from the EU remains marked by ambiguity, shifting between calls for Europe to prioritize domestic concerns and demands for participation in US-Israeli operations against Iran, Europeans will need to chart a more autonomous strategic course. In terms of the EU’s role in its neighborhood, this could entail advancing security frameworks rooted in multilateralism, guided by respect for international law,and anchored in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
Europe’s defense gap won’t be solved overnight
Besides laying out these strategic priorities, the primary challenge of the European Security Strategy will be to cut through and consolidate the profusion of European defense initiatives since 2022. From military mobility projects to proposals aimed at creating a single defense market, the strategy will need to stitch together disparate efforts and present a coherent and unified vision for European defense policy.
If successful, this would leave the EU significantly better positioned to move from planning to action, be it in Ukraine or the Gulf.
