The Japanese government is set to revamp its intelligence and anti-espionage institutional structures, to include the establishment of a new National Intelligence Agency and the introduction of an anti-spy law alongside a system for mandatory foreign agent registration.
Details on the intelligence overhaul comes as a panel of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) revealed on February 26 a series of proposals for “drastically strengthening” Japan’s cross-agency information-gathering and analysis capabilities. The government is also expected to assemble a panel of experts this summer in order to review the anti-espionage legislation.[1]
The measures to strengthen Japan’s intelligence community (IC) apparatus, an area agreed upon by the LDP’s coalition partner Nippon Ishin no Kai and a long-held concern of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, are expected to help bring Japan’s capabilities closer in line with like-minded countries such as the United States and United Kingdom.
About the Proposal to Establish a “National Intelligence Agency”
The prospective National Intelligence Agency is intended to function as a central command hub for both domestic and overseas intelligence activities, consolidating and centrally analyzing information gathered across Japan’s government ministries and agencies.[2]
Intelligence experts in Japan have emphasized the need for such an intelligence “command tower” to break down the siloed information collected by various components of the country’s IC. These include the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defense (JMOD), the National Police Agency (NPA), and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA).[3]
This fragmentation means, for example, that MOFA collects key diplomatic intelligence, JMOD military intelligence, and the NPA domestic security intelligence, yet these streams are not systematically integrated under a single authoritative framework.
While CIRO currently performs a central intelligence role in aggregating intelligence from the other ministries, it has limited legal authorities and operational capacities. It has therefore exhibited mixed results in its ability to break down institutional siloes and transmit integrated intelligence assessments to the highest level of policymaking, including to the Prime Minister.[4]
The National Intelligence Agency is therefore expected to address key intelligence-sharing shortcomings by serving as a more powerful central hub than CIRO. It would have the authority to compel ministries and agencies to share the intelligence they collect, consolidate that information, and produce more comprehensive intelligence assessments for the Prime Minister.[5]
The LDP’s February 26 proposals, drafted by the party’s Headquarters for Intelligence Strategy, also called for the National Intelligence Agency to be headed by a parliamentary vice minister. This would make the new agency a body with stature comparable to the National Security Secretariat (NSS).[6]
The prospective National Intelligence Agency could therefore be viewed as the intelligence-policy counterpart to the NSS, which was established back in 2014 and serves as the government’s central coordinating hub for national security, staffed by officials seconded from multiple ministries and agencies.[7]
From an international perspective, ensuring that the new National Intelligence Agency has the legal authority to compel other agencies to share information, along with enhanced political status, would help bring Japan’s intelligence coordination framework more in line with those of the U.S. and the UK.
For example, the United States’ Director of National Intelligence (DNI) holds cabinet-level status, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has various legal powers to help coordinate and integrate intelligence activities across the American IC.[8]
Nevertheless, recent reports in Japan[9] of inter-agency competition between MOFA and the NPA over the structure and leadership of the proposed National Intelligence Agency suggest that further political and bureaucratic negotiations will be necessary before the agency can be established as an effective intelligence hub.
Moreover, even if this institutional upgrade is achieved, Japan will also need to acquire enhanced intelligence aggregation and evaluation infrastructure.
This includes the acquisition of new analytic systems and support mechanisms to ensure that the new National Intelligence Agency can effectively process and assess the larger volume of information it can be expected to receive.[10]
In response to this challenge, the LDP’s Intelligence Strategy Headquarters panel has called for the government to establish a new secure digital system for sharing the information collected and analyzed by each ministry and agency.[11]
This is likely to be coupled with the acquisition of enhanced communications, radio frequency, and electronic detection equipment to help the government implement its aim of expanding Japan’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.
About the Proposed “Anti-Spy Law” and “Foreign Agents Registration System”
Following the establishment of a National Intelligence Agency will be the introduction of a new anti-spy law.
The anti-espionage legislation will be drafted on the basis of discussions by an expert panel set to convene this summer. The government then aims to submit related bills sometime during the extraordinary Diet session this autumn or in next year’s regular Diet Session.[12]
Takaichi, a strong proponent for anti-espionage legislation, had previously submitted last May to the then Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba a proposal that the government should begin work to introduce measures that would bring Japan in line with other countries.[13]
A key component of the anti-spy law will be the establishment of a mandatory registration system for foreign agents operating within Japan to report their activities.
The move follows growing concerns in recent years of efforts by China and Russia to influence Japanese public opinion and electoral outcomes. Analysts have highlighted a need for Japan to strengthen its counterintelligence apparatus against such operations.[14]
Japan’s planned foreign agents registration system is expected to draw on frameworks adopted by the U.S. and the UK.[15] Local Japanese media also indicates that the system could cover both foreign governments and foreign-owned companies.[16]
A comparison of the key differences between the American and British frameworks, particularly regarding the scope of foreign organizations they cover, is especially relevant here in understanding which model Japan may reference.
In the U.S., the closest equivalent would be the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).nacted in 1938, this scheme requires certain agents acting on behalf of foreign principals to register with the Department of Justice and disclose their activities.[17]
Meanwhile, the UK’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) was launched much more recently in July 2025 as a response to concerns of overseas interference in the country’s 2016 Brexit referendum and 2019 general election campaigns.[18]
Broad in scope, the United States’ FARA can be applied to agents acting on behalf of a wide range of foreign principals, including foreign governments, state-run organizations (such as China’s state media outlets Xinhua News Agency and China Global Television Network[19]), and other foreign entities organized under the laws of a foreign country or having their principal place of business abroad.[20]
By contrast, the scope of Britain’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) is narrower in terms of the foreign organizations covered. It focuses squarely on activities conducted at the direction of a “foreign power,” specifically foreign governments and entities controlled by them.[21] It therefore does not encompass the broader category of foreign principals under U.S. FARA, which can include private corporations based abroad.
It will therefore be of interest to overseas companies looking to expand into Japan to see what scope Tokyo’s prospective foreign agents registration system will have. Looking ahead, such details are likely to be discussed by the government’s expert panel over the summer.
Conclusions
Overall, Tokyo’s proposed National Intelligence Agency and the Anti-Spy Law, along with its foreign agents registration system, can be expected to help curb foreign interference by hostile nation-states and to strengthen the country’s resilience against sensitive information leaks.
In addition to the measures assessed here, the Japanese government is also reported to be proposing to enhance human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities, expand the staff and budget of the international terrorism collection unit, and to ban visitors from taking mobile phones into important government buildings.[22]
Establishing a more resilient intelligence apparatus in line with the U.S., the UK, and other Five Eyes nations will be essential not only to strengthen trust in Japan’s ability to safeguard sensitive shared intelligence, but also to support the expansion of Japan’s defense industry and instill greater confidence of its partner countries when conducting co-development projects.
Notes:
[1] Sankei Shimbun, “自民、インテリジェンス機能強化へ提言取りまとめ 同志国と「比肩」する水準に引き上げ” [LDP compiles proposals to strengthen intelligence capabilities, raising them to a level “on par” with like-minded countries], February 26, 2026, https://www.sankei.com/article/20260226-CFKFE46RDJJ6XHUBYU2V5LRKCU/.
[2] Yahoo Japan News, “警察庁vs外務省「国家情報局」の主導権を巡る血みどろの戦い…「一見、警察側の敗北に見えますが、実態は逆で…」何が起きているのか” [A bloody battle for leadership between the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “National Intelligence Agency”… “At first glance, it seems like the police have lost, but in reality, it’s the opposite…” What’s going on?]. February 27, 2026, https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/453257714cdfffa04527103ab7a7d717b66a3e85.
[3] Daniel Manning, “New Intelligence ‘Command Tower’ to Anchor Japan’s Security Overhaul”. Japan Forward, February 25, 2026, Yoshiki Kobayashi, “Re-assign the Organizational Characteristics of Japan’s Intelligence Community and Its Social and Political Backgrounds”. Meiji Journal of Governance Studies, Vol.8, 2023-06, pp.1-20, https://www.meiji.ac.jp/mugs2/journal/6t5h7p00001r78oy-att/Vol.8.pdf.
[4] Michael Macarthur Bosack, “What will Japan’s planned intelligence bureau look like?” Japan Times, December 14, 2025, ; Yoshiki Kobayashi, “Re-assign the Organizational Characteristics of Japan’s Intelligence Community and Its Social and Political Backgrounds”. Meiji Journal of Governance Studies, Vol.8, 2023-06, pp.1-20, https://www.meiji.ac.jp/mugs2/journal/6t5h7p00001r78oy-att/Vol.8.pdf.
[5] Yahoo Japan News, “警察庁vs外務省「国家情報局」の主導権を巡る血みどろの戦い…「一見、警察側の敗北に見えますが、実態は逆で…」何が起きているのか” [A bloody battle for leadership between the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “National Intelligence Agency”… “At first glance, it seems like the police have lost, but in reality, it’s the opposite…” What’s going on?]. February 27, 2026, https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/453257714cdfffa04527103ab7a7d717b66a3e85?page=1.
[6] Jiji News, “LDP Drafts Recommendations to Strengthen Intelligence Activities”, February 26, 2026, Himari Semans, “LDP panel approves proposal to strengthen intelligence capabilities”, Japan Times, February 26, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/26/japan/politics/ldp-intelligence-proposal/.
[7] Michael Bosack, “Japan’s National Security Secretariat, Four Years On.” Tokyo Review, February 8, 2018, https://www.tokyoreview.net/2018/02/japans-national-security-secretariat-four-years/.
[8] Yoshiki Kobayashi, “Re-assign the Organizational Characteristics of Japan’s Intelligence Community and Its Social and Political Backgrounds”. Meiji Journal of Governance Studies, Vol.8, 2023-06, p.13, https://www.meiji.ac.jp/mugs2/journal/6t5h7p00001r78oy-att/Vol.8.pdf.
[9] Yahoo Japan News, “警察庁vs外務省「国家情報局」の主導権を巡る血みどろの戦い…「一見、警察側の敗北に見えますが、実態は逆で…」何が起きているのか” [A bloody battle for leadership between the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “National Intelligence Agency”… “At first glance, it seems like the police have lost, but in reality, it’s the opposite…” What’s going on?]. February 27, 2026, https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/453257714cdfffa04527103ab7a7d717b66a3e85?page=1.
[10] Jun Yanagi, “Strengthening Intelligence as a Component of Japan’s National Power.” JIIA Strategic Comments (2015-14), November 28, 2025, https://www.jiia.or.jp/eng/report/2025/11/2025-14.html.
[11] Nikkei Shimbun, “自民「省庁横断で情報共有システムを」 インテリジェンス強化へ提言” [LDP proposes “cross-ministerial information sharing system” to strengthen intelligence], February 25, 2026, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA2444B0U6A220C2000000/.
[12] Kyodo News, “スパイ防止法へ今夏に有識者会議 市民監視、表現の自由制約に懸念” [Experts to hold panel on anti-espionage law this summer, raising concerns about citizen surveillance and restrictions on freedom of expression], February 17, 2026, https://news.jp/i/1396422012193751520?c=39550187727945729.
[13] LDP Research Commission on Public Security, Counter-Terrorism, and Anti-Cybercrime Measures, “「治安力」の強化に関する提言 ～安全・安心な日本を取り戻すために～” [Proposals for strengthening public safety: To restore a safe and secure Japan], May 28, 2025, https://www.jimin.jp/news/policy/210667.html.
[14] Naoki Takeda, “Foreign Influence in Japan: Lessons from the UK, US and Australia”. RUSI Insight Paper, December 17, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/foreign-influence-japan-lessons-uk-us-and-australia.
[15] JIJI News, “LDP considers mandatory reporting by foreign agents in Japan”. Japan Times, February 22, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/22/japan/politics/ldp-foreign-agents-mandatory-reporting/.
[16] Nikkei Shimbun, “スパイ防止法、夏にも有識者会議 外国代理人登録制度など念頭” [Experts to hold anti-espionage law meeting this summer, with foreign agent registration system in mind], February 17, 2026, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA170PF0X10C26A2000000/.
[17] U.S. Department of Justice, “Foreign Agents Registration Act Home: Frequently Asked Questions”, https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/frequently-asked-questions.
[18] Naoki Takeda, “Foreign Influence in Japan: Lessons from the UK, US and Australia”. RUSI Insight Paper, December 17, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/foreign-influence-japan-lessons-uk-us-and-australia.
[19] Covington & Burling LLP, “The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA): A Guide for the Perplexed”, Updated January 31, 2023, https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2018/01/the-foreign-agents-registration-act-fara.
[20] U.S. Department of Justice, “Foreign Agents Registration Act Home: Frequently Asked Questions”, https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/frequently-asked-questions.
[21] UK Home Office, “Introduction to the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) (accessible version)”, Updated July 24, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-influence-registration-scheme-introduction/introduction-to-the-foreign-influence-registration-scheme-firs-accessible-version.
[22] JIJI News, “LDP considers mandatory reporting by foreign agents in Japan”. Japan Times, February 22, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/22/japan/politics/ldp-foreign-agents-mandatory-reporting/.
This article was originally posted on NSBT Japan, the first defense and security industry network in Japan. The publication provides the latest information on security business trends both within Japan and overseas. Asian Military Review began exchanging articles with NSBT Japan in April 2024.
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