A raft of ‘novel effector’ technologies are maturing at pace. Some, such as hypersonic missiles, are already in operational use. Others, such as Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) are on the cusp of more regular deployment. The landscape for these technologies is fast-moving, and accelerating, but the strategic implications of these technologies are poorly understood. This impacts international governance and stability, and the UK’s relative positioning in these technologies.
This project, commissioned by the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), explores the strategic stability implications of so-called ‘novel effector’ technologies in the defence context. It defines the novel effector technologies of most strategic concern and charts their development trajectories across major actors. Using a strategic cultures lens of analysis, it then considers relative perceptions of their use across major actors before considering options for their international governance based on the most pressing gaps and risks, before assessing opportunities for the UK.
Novel effector technologies are complex to categorise and have varied implications, but they share three strategic implications. Focusing on hypersonics, directed energy weapons, cyber, autonomous & electromagnetic pulse, we identified three core common characteristics. Each of these technologies can compress decision-making timescales, reduce attributability and proliferate widely. These risks are heightened by divergent assumptions among major actors about how such may be used. In some contexts, non-nuclear systems could also be perceived as threatening nuclear command and control, creating escalation risks.
Prospects for binding international governance in these technologies are found to be limited, given low convergence between major actors on the technologies’ intended uses and acceptable constraints. However, targeted transparency and confidence-building measures could help manage the most acute risks: miscalculation and inadvertent escalation for hypersonics and DEWs; and ambiguity over civilian infrastructure, legitimate targets and human oversight for autonomous, cyber and electromagnetic effectors.
The UK also has competitive opportunities in this technology space. The UK’s defence research and development (R&D) base and strengths in DEWs and selected hypersonic sub-systems create scope for targeted leadership. A selective approach would prioritise sovereign ownership where essential, collaboration with allies where advantageous, and assured access to fast-moving innovations where partnership is the most efficient route.
This work was commissioned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) and conducted by RAND Europe.
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