Donald Trump has Pyongyang on his mind. In recent months, the U.S. president has made comments to the media suggesting he is in communication with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In an August 17 Truth Social post, for instance, Trump announced that the United States would scale back joint military drills with South Korea. The decision, he wrote, was “based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un,” describing the dictator as “unthreatening and respectful.”
Trump has not been subtle about his desire to restart diplomacy with Kim. With an eye on his legacy and the war with Iran stalemated, he is eager to notch a foreign policy win. During his first term, Trump held two historic U.S.–North Korean summits aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula—but both foundered because of the countries’ disparate expectations for the terms of a deal. Since his reelection, Trump has been looking to reopen talks with Kim. The ball is now in Pyongyang’s court, and Kim has signaled, if not an eagerness for renewed engagement, at least an unwillingness to rule it out. In August, after Trump insisted for the second time that he was in touch with Pyongyang, Kim Yo Jong—the leader’s influential sister—released a statement that read: “Regarding the reports from Washington about recent communication between the top leaders of North Korea and the U.S., I am completely unaware of such matters. It has been stated on numerous occasions that our head of state holds fond personal memories and positive feelings toward Trump. The relationship between the leaders remains excellent.” Although this is far from an agreement to meet, Kim Jong Un is not closing the door.
If leader-to-leader talks materialize, Trump may believe his personal rapport with Kim will yield a deal. But he will be facing a very different North Korea than the one at their last meeting in 2019. The fallout from unfinished diplomacy during Trump’s first term, the COVID-19 pandemic, and global trends such as the sharp escalation in U.S.-Chinese strategic rivalry and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have destabilized the security landscape and created formidable obstacles to peaceful engagement. Meanwhile, North Korea’s continued nuclear and conventional military expansion and the growing support it is receiving from Moscow have strengthened Kim’s hand. Facing an emboldened Pyongyang, Trump can no longer fall back on the same concessions and negotiation tactics he used in previous talks.
For a U.S.–North Korean summit to be successful, the United States must approach it with well-defined strategic goals and a clear understanding of what concessions it is willing to make. Washington should shift its focus away from denuclearization, at least in the short term, to concentrate on more achievable nuclear arms control and safety measures. The United States should also maintain a capable troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and reiterate its security assurances—particularly its nuclear-deterrence guarantees—to regional allies such as South Korea and Japan.
Although diplomacy with North Korea has historically been difficult, Trump is eager to meet with Kim, and both sides want to avoid pushing the Indo-Pacific toward nuclear proliferation or all-out war. Careful engagement with Pyongyang could defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula and lay the groundwork for a more stable security landscape.
TABLES TURNED
Since the U.S.–North Korean summit in 2019, the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran have reshaped the Indo-Pacific in ways that strengthen Kim’s hand. The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has drawn Washington’s focus away from Asia as, for the third time in the past quarter century, U.S. strategic attention and military assets have surged to the Middle East. The last American aircraft carrier stationed in the Indo-Pacific departed for the Persian Gulf in August, and U.S. strikes on Iran have rapidly depleted American munitions stockpiles. Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies, already strained by Trump’s abrupt policy shifts and punishing tariffs, are now concerned about deteriorating deterrence. Asian economies—many of which are deeply dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies—have contracted as the Strait of Hormuz has remained compromised. Amid signs of further American retrenchment, U.S. allies and partners are increasingly skeptical about Washington’s commitment to the region.
Even more consequential is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has benefited North Korea in numerous ways. Moscow and Pyongyang’s once dormant relationship has flourished as Kim has sent thousands of munitions to replenish Russia’s depleted stockpiles and thousands of soldiers to fight and die in the ongoing ground war. Images of the new memorial to the Korean People’s Army soldiers who have perished in the invasion suggest an already significant loss of North Korean lives. In return, Pyongyang has received generous assistance from Moscow in violation of international sanctions, including abundant financial support for Kim’s regime and technology transfers that have enhanced North Korean military capabilities and may help Pyongyang more accurately deliver intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. Russian patronage allows Kim to shower his regime’s elites with the economic benefits needed to cement their loyalty.
Still, it is worth questioning how durable this partnership is. After more than four years of grinding warfare with no end in sight, Moscow is increasingly isolated and may be in a poor position to continue supporting Pyongyang. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has allowed China to expand its presence in Central Asia, for instance, and Turkey to deepen its influence in Azerbaijan. Russian aggression has spurred Armenia and Moldova to look westward, and hundreds of thousands of young Russian men have fled the country to avoid military conscription while over a thousand Western companies have left. International sanctions are starving Russia of badly needed capital and technology, and Russian war policies have created huge imbalances and inflation, possibly with worse to come for the Russian economy. If North Korea continues to actively support Moscow in this war, and Russia fails or is defeated, the world will become a much more hostile place for Pyongyang.
Russia and North Korea’s deepening ties have already begun to reshape China’s interests in the region. Beijing is still Pyongyang’s most important partner, but the dynamic has changed considerably in recent years. Beijing previously saw denuclearization as a top priority on the Korean Peninsula—a shared objective, and at times a rare area of cooperation, with the United States. It disliked the destabilizing impact that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons had on tensions between the North and South and expended political capital responding to international condemnation of Pyongyang. Between 2006 and 2017, Beijing agreed to a series of UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions and other restrictions on Pyongyang in response to six North Korean nuclear tests. Now, pressed to maintain its influence in Pyongyang amid a growing Russian–North Korean security relationship—and with the rest of the world distracted by other geopolitical crises—China has gone silent on the issue. When Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited North Korea in June to reassert his influence, denuclearization was not publicly mentioned. China’s new approach will make U.S. engagement on this issue more challenging and risks driving other regional powers, such as South Korea and Japan, to reconsider their own policies on the deployment or development of nuclear weapons.
Whether Pyongyang reengages with the United States may also depend on how much North Korea relies on China for economic support. Much of North Korean commerce passes through China, and although Beijing and Pyongyang’s relationship appears fairly stable, it remains wary and transactional, with each side skeptical of the other’s motives. North Korea may seek to reengage with the United States to counterbalance its overdependence on China, or as a hedge against Russia’s failure in its war with Ukraine. Conversely, as Trump and Xi upgrade and stabilize U.S.-Chinese relations, China could step in to broker the next Trump-Kim meeting.
KIM POSSIBLE
The Kim dynasty has long vexed U.S. policymakers. Washington has sought multiple deals with North Korea, including during Trump’s first-term summits with Kim, but missteps and mistrust on both sides derailed them. Pyongyang has proved resilient to both U.S. and international sanctions. Indeed, during the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea sealed its borders and deprived itself far more severely than sanctions could, yet it still survived. U.S. congressional interventions on human rights and humanitarian aid, meanwhile, have mostly failed to change North Korea’s behavior. Pyongyang has also cushioned the impact of sanctions by engaging in cybertheft, such as its $6.3 billion heist against the cryptocurrency exchange Binance this October. All the while, Pyongyang has steadily advanced its military capabilities and expanded its nuclear arsenal.
Although Washington’s previous attempts to rein in North Korea have failed, Trump’s renewed eagerness to meet with Kim and his unorthodox approach to foreign policy could provide a new opening for diplomacy. Trump has cultivated a direct relationship with Kim, shunning the bureaucratic negotiations that usually precede a deal. While a performative summit alone would be of little benefit to U.S. interests, Washington could use reengagement with Pyongyang to thaw inter-Korean relations and stabilize the peninsula by slowing or freezing North Korea’s nuclear buildup. Those goals may seem conventional, but as regional tensions worsen and Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal grows, they are essential to averting potentially catastrophic conflict.
Three questions cast a shadow over the possibility of renewed engagement between the United States and North Korea. First is the specific purpose of restarting engagement: What is the goal? Second is how to reopen communications. Despite Trump’s claims, there is no real proof that he has recently interacted with Kim. All evidence suggests the last contact between American and North Korean officials was in 2019, and it may be challenging to break a seven-year drought. Third is what are the incentives and tradeoffs the United States would be willing to consider as part of a negotiation—the same issue that bedeviled U.S. and North Korean officials in Hanoi.
One possible formula for progress is focusing, at least temporarily, on steady arms control and international safety controls rather than the elusive goal of denuclearization. Denuclearization should remain Washington’s ultimate aspiration. But in the meantime, a North Korea awash with even more nuclear weapons makes the world only more dangerous. This approach will require serious diplomacy to minimize second-order consequences, particularly to avoid weakening U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific or triggering a collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation regime among nations that might see their only recourse as acquiring their own nuclear weapons. China, and perhaps even Russia, may concur with Washington on this point, and a shared desire to avoid more nuclear states in East Asia could help restart engagement.
ART OF THE DEAL
Kim has substantially more leverage now than in earlier encounters with Trump. Reopening communication will require using a mix of positive and negative assurances to convince him that he is unlikely to get a better chance to strike a deal. Kim may press the United States to scale back aspects of its cooperation with South Korea—such as joint military exercises and support for Seoul’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines—as preconditions for a meeting with Trump. Kim may even propose his own assurances of peace on the peninsula in exchange for a reduction of U.S. military forces in South Korea, although it is unclear whether Trump would agree to such conditions.
In the worst-case scenario, Kim may take advantage of Trump’s eagerness to make a deal to extract weighty concessions from the United States. Kim has little reason to meet with Trump now, unless he calculates that he can secure major terms such as de facto recognition as a nuclear state, reduced sanctions, or a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula. Kim would likely insist that there be no discussion of denuclearization, North Korea’s support for the invasion of Ukraine, Pyongyang’s human rights abuses, or a final accounting for Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea under the rule of Kim Il Sung. Granting such concessions would end the U.S.–South Korean alliance.
To ensure North Korea does not exploit the Trump administration, Washington must carefully consider what tradeoffs it is willing to make. Lifting sanctions, abandoning or delaying the denuclearization process, temporarily accepting North Korea as a nuclear state, and reducing the U.S. military presence in South Korea are all long-standing demands of Kim’s regime that are likely on the table. Although lifting international sanctions would require UN Security Council consensus, Trump may be willing to reduce unilateral U.S. sanctions, which he considers an obstacle to better bilateral relations and which have been ineffective in stemming Pyongyang’s nuclear advances.
Although denuclearization has been a major talking point for U.S. administrations since the early 1990s, the Trump administration may need to set it aside, at least in the short term. Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities have increased since Trump’s 2018 and 2019 summits with Kim, suggesting that the stalemate caused by continued U.S. demands for the full-scale dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program may have given Kim time and space to grow his arsenal. Even if denuclearization remains a long-term U.S. priority—and it should—pragmatism is essential to reducing the threat posed by Kim’s regime. In exchange for stepping away from denuclearization, Trump should demand that Kim freeze any further expansion of his arsenal and explore possibilities for greater strategic stability, including renewed inter-Korean dialogue, transparency and confidence-building efforts, security measures that bolster nuclear facilities’ safety and guard against accidents, and strict adherence to nonproliferation. Trump must make it clear to Kim that an unconstrained expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal will pressure South Korea and Japan to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory and possibly develop their own.
Washington must pursue nuanced diplomacy to avoid creating a stronger Pyongyang.
Regardless of Kim’s demands, the United States must preserve its troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and continue joint military exercises with South Korea as long as the threat of North Korean aggression persists. The mantra of U.S. troops in South Korea is “ready to fight tonight.” Joint military exercises keep U.S. and South Korean forces prepared for combat, which is essential to deterring North Korean attacks. It would be dangerous and irresponsible to send American soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen to the peninsula without ensuring peak readiness. Instead of withdrawing troops, the United States should offer confidence-building measures to North Korea—practices that reduce the risk of conflict breaking out because of misjudgment. These could include military-to-military engagement and security reassurances among the United States, South Korea, and North Korea, or greater transparency around military exercises—allowing observers on a reciprocal basis, for example. Sustaining Washington’s alliance with South Korea and avoiding cascading nuclear proliferation are critical to U.S. interests in the region. American negotiators must remind Kim that the U.S. military presence and its extended nuclear-deterrence guarantees for Seoul and Tokyo hold back even larger conventional military—and possibly nuclear—buildups in the region.
Finally, North Korea and the United States—and perhaps, in time, South Korea and Japan—should sustain diplomatic engagement by agreeing to assign diplomats to each other’s capitals through reciprocal liaison offices, which would maintain relations without granting full diplomatic recognition. In 2018 and 2019, the two sides discussed housing such diplomats in the German Embassy in Pyongyang and the Swedish Embassy in Washington. Liaison offices would also stabilize and prolong the communication necessary to quietly work through complex negotiations.
If North Korea rejects Trump’s overtures, the United States is not without options. Washington could pressure the Kim regime by intensifying the scale and tempo of joint military exercises with South Korea; deploying American armaments, including short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and possibly nuclear weapons, to South Korea and Japan; and pursuing a new campaign to choke off North Korea’s economic resources through sanctions and interdiction. The United States could also deploy additional air defense assets to Japan and South Korea, including THAAD air defense radar systems and interceptors. Washington and its allies could dramatically expand efforts to undermine Kim’s rule by mounting sustained criticisms of North Korea’s dangerously large nuclear weapons arsenal and its use of international criminal enterprise to steal from and economically defraud other nations, which could spur other countries to curb their material or diplomatic support for North Korea or more aggressively sanction Kim’s regime.
THIRD WHEELS
Beyond short-term negotiations, a fourth question is less complicated but just as important: What role should Japan and South Korea play in U.S. engagements with North Korea? Many past administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have considered coordination with allies essential to establishing a durable solution on the Korean Peninsula. But Trump’s antipathy toward alliances suggests close consultation with South Korea and Japan is unlikely. Their absence from the negotiating table may actually accelerate U.S.–North Korean engagement, because coordination across allied governments can be unwieldy and slow, and Pyongyang has not been receptive to past overtures by Seoul and Tokyo. Although South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi both rhetorically back engagement with North Korea, Pyongyang has bluntly rejected their outreach.
Even if Seoul and Tokyo are not directly engaged in U.S.–North Korean diplomacy, they would still likely welcome a U.S.-led deal with Kim if it protects their core security interests. But a deal with Kim that ignores American allies’ concerns would be dangerous. South Korea harbors an appetite to develop its own nuclear arsenal, particularly if it feels U.S. security protections are receding. Should Seoul move in that direction, Tokyo would almost certainly reconsider its own nonnuclear status, potentially igniting a nuclear arms race in Asia. Given North Korea’s long-standing hostility toward both Japan and South Korea, proliferation would destabilize the Indo-Pacific and leave the global nonproliferation regime in tatters.
Any deal, even one that addresses Seoul’s and Tokyo’s core interests, will likely need to be paired with American security reassurances to allies’ governments and publics. Japan and South Korea must continue building their own conventional defense capabilities while the United States sustains its commitment to defending its Asian allies—especially extended nuclear deterrence. The United States must pursue delicate, nuanced diplomacy to avoid creating a stronger, legitimized North Korea; straining its alliances with Seoul and Tokyo; and debilitating the international nonproliferation regime.
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Despite the risks of U.S.–North Korean engagement, the time may be ripe to break the diplomatic paralysis that has allowed Pyongyang to advance its military capabilities for so long. The last two years of Trump’s presidency—particularly his summitry calendar in late 2026—will bring him to Asia, potentially facilitating a meeting with Kim. Such a visit would present the best chance for the kind of performative, high-profile meeting that both Trump and Kim favor.
Trump is the ultimate iconoclast in traditional great-power politics, as evidenced by his shifting relationships with Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which could shape Washington’s engagement with Pyongyang. Still, there may be a way to leverage Trump’s affection for Kim, and Kim’s recent restraint in criticizing the United States, to outline a deal that arrests the growing threat of North Korean nuclear weapons.
The bruising Republican defeat in the U.S. midterm elections could also change North Korea’s diplomatic calculus, especially because it suggests Trump’s political standing in the United States has faltered, and he may struggle to deliver the results Kim seeks. Trump may force the issue, however, and propose a meeting with Kim after the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Shenzhen, China. It would not be surprising for Trump to suggest that this meeting take place in Pyongyang, putting Kim on the spot. If leader-to-leader talks occur, both sides should remember the central lesson from Trump’s first-term summits: engagement without sufficient preparation and clearly defined goals is not enough to strengthen security and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific raise the prospect of a much darker future, where conditions on the Korean Peninsula remain unchanged and Asia’s entanglements in European and Middle Eastern conflicts metastasize into a new world war—perhaps ignited in Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula. Even if no war breaks out, in just a few years the United States could find itself in a world where Asia’s five current nuclear states are joined by two, three, or more new players.
But this future is not inevitable. All the leaders engaged in North Korean security debates—from Lee and Takaichi to Xi and Putin—want to avoid such escalation. Even the North Koreans surely recognize this is the most dangerous path. This shared goal means diplomacy is still possible, despite formidable challenges. For all Trump’s idiosyncrasies, one should take his desire to peacefully end tensions on the Korean Peninsula at face value. He has made his intentions clear. What happens next is up to Chairman Kim.
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