Few subjects appear less central to the intellectual legacy of Africa’s great conceptualizer, Ali Mazrui, than China. Unlike Islam, the West, Pan-Africanism, globalization, or the United States, China never occupied a sustained place in his scholarship. He never wrote a book devoted to China, nor did he establish himself as a specialist on Chinese politics or foreign policy. Yet such observations can be misleading. Mazrui possessed an intellectual curiosity that defied disciplinary and geographical boundaries. Throughout his career, he occasionally turned to China whenever broader questions of race, revolution, modernization, global power, and Africa’s international relations demanded attention. Although these interventions were relatively few and scattered (see for instance, Mazrui 1973, 1976, 2016; Mazrui and Adem 2013), they were rarely incidental. They often contained conceptual innovations and remarkably prescient observations that anticipated developments occurring decades later. Indeed, long before China’s spectacular economic ascent transformed global politics, Mazrui had already begun asking questions that have since become central to the study of Sino-African relations. Why was China attracted to Africa? Was race an important element in Chinese-African solidarity? Could socialist ideology overcome cultural differences? Would China’s rise resemble European imperialism or represent an entirely different historical phenomenon? Could China become a great power without reproducing Western hegemonic behavior? These questions had been at the center of Mazrui’s scholarship on China.
This article argues that Mazrui’s contribution to the study of Sino-African relations has been significantly underestimated. Although he was not a Sinologist in the conventional sense, he anticipated many of the major debates that now dominate the field. His importance lies less in the quantity of his writings on China than in the originality of his conceptual framework. We can approach Mazrui’s contributions to the study of Sino-African relations in two ways. The first examines Mazrui’s explicit writings on the subject, tracing the evolution of his thinking from the Bandung era through China’s economic rise under Deng Xiaoping. The second adopts what may appropriately be called Mazrui’s (1963: 122) own unique method. Rather than limiting ourselves to Mazrui’s texts explicitly concerned with China, this method extracts broader concepts developed elsewhere in Mazrui’s massive scholarship and applies them to contemporary Sino-African relations. Such an approach also reflects Mazrui’s own intellectual practice. He consistently transported concepts across historical and geographical settings, believing that ideas acquire greater explanatory power when liberated from the narrow circumstances in which they were originally formulated. Mazrui thus emerges not merely as an observer of China’s engagement with Africa but as an important theorist whose ideas remain highly relevant for understanding one of the most consequential international relationships of the twenty-first century.
Mazrui, the (Reluctant) Sinologist
As indicated above, Mazrui was not a Sinologist in the professional sense. He neither specialized in Chinese history nor claimed expertise in Chinese civilization comparable to such scholars as John Fairbank or Lucian Pye. Yet his engagement with China displayed precisely those characteristics that distinguished his scholarship more generally: comparative imagination, conceptual innovation, historical sensitivity, and a willingness to ask unconventional questions. For Mazrui, China mattered not primarily because it was China, but because it illuminated larger questions about Africa’s place in world politics. His writings on China span two distinct historical periods. The first covers the revolutionary era from Bandung in 1955 until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms beginning in 1978–79. The second examines China’s post-Mao transformation into an emerging global economic power. The transition from the first to the second period fundamentally altered both China’s international identity and Africa’s relationship with Beijing.
Mazrui (1967: 209-2011) regarded the Bandung Conference of 1955 as one of the defining moments in postcolonial international history. Bandung represented more than diplomatic cooperation among newly independent states. It inaugurated what Mazrui memorably termed pigmentation solidarity—a political consciousness rooted in shared experiences of domination by white imperial powers. This did not imply biological notions of race. Rather, it was a reference to a shared historical condition produced by colonialism. China occupied a unique position within this emerging coalition. Unlike European colonial powers, China appeared as another victim of Western imperialism. Having endured foreign occupation and unequal treaties, China could identify with Africa’s anti-colonial struggles from the standpoint of shared historical humiliation rather than imperial superiority. For Mazrui, this constituted the first phase of Sino-African relations.
Pigmentation solidarity alone could not sustain long-term political cooperation. Mazrui therefore identified a second stage which he termed pan-proletarianism. Here the basis of solidarity shifted from race to economics. China and Africa became, in his memorable phrase, “comrades in poverty.” Instead of interpreting Third World solidarity solely through ideology, he emphasized the sociological importance of shared underdevelopment. Both China and Africa occupied subordinate positions within the international economy, both sought rapid modernization, and both confronted technological backwardness inherited from colonial or semi-colonial histories. Economic deprivation thus became an additional foundation for political cooperation. Unlike orthodox Marxism, however, Mazrui’s analysis remained profoundly postcolonial. Shared poverty mattered because it reflected historical structures of global inequality rather than universal laws of capitalist development.
The third stage of Sino-African relations consisted of what Mazrui called pan-socialism. During the 1960s and early 1970s, China increasingly sought ideological allies throughout Africa in two ways. The first was dissident pan-socialism, whereby Beijing supported revolutionary movements challenging existing governments. The second was authoritative pan-socialism, characterized by alliances with governments already committed to socialist transformation. Mazrui thus demonstrated an unusual sensitivity to variations within socialist internationalism. China’s Africa policy was never ideologically uniform. It evolved according to changing domestic priorities and international circumstances.
One of the most subtle aspects of Mazrui’s analysis concerned race.Mazrui (1973: 177) argued: “The place of race in Sino-African relations has remained more significant as a reaction to the historical role of the white races of the world, rather than as direct color consciousness on the part of the Chinese.” Mazrui thus rejected simplistic assumptions that race operated identically everywhere. Instead, racial solidarity emerged as a historical response to European domination rather than intrinsic affinity.Yet Mazrui (1973: 177) was also careful to avoid romanticism by immediately thus trying to qualify his argument: “Given Chinese historic nationalism and chauvinism, there is no doubt that some degree of condescension is present in their inner orientation toward their new black friends.” This combination of empathy and skepticism exemplifies Mazrui at his best. He recognized both the emancipatory potential and the hierarchical tendencies embedded within Sino-African relations.
Mazrui also identified one of the great paradoxes of Maoist politics. Mao transformed classical Marxism by assigning revolutionary leadership to peasants rather than industrial workers. This represented, in Mazrui’s (1973: 163) own words, the ruralization of Marxism. Yet African politics often failed to mirror this revolutionary sociology. His observation regarding Kenya remains striking. Although Mao elevated peasants in theory, China’s strongest political connections in Kenya were with urban Luo elites rather than rural Kikuyu communities. The paradox illustrated Mazrui’s broader insight. Ideas frequently travel in unexpected ways. Political alliances seldom conform neatly to ideological doctrines. China’s reform era fundamentally altered the basis of engagement with Africa. Revolution gave way to development; ideology yielded increasingly to commerce; solidarity became institutionalized through investment, infrastructure, and trade.Although Mazrui wrote comparatively less about this period, several of his conceptual innovations became even more relevant. Most important was his distinction between intrinsic and derivative interests.
In the late post-Cold War period, some observers interpreted renewed Western engagement with Africa as evidence of growing recognition of Africa’s strategic importance. Mazrui disagreed. Mazrui (2012) argued that Western intrinsic interest in Africa had declined. What increased instead was derivative interest. Africa became important because China had become important. Western governments returned to Africa largely in response to China’s expanding influence rather than because Africa itself had acquired greater autonomous significance. This distinction anticipated later debates over strategic competition between China and Western powers across Africa. Today, whether discussing the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the European Union’s Global Gateway, or renewed American diplomacy, Mazrui’s distinction remains remarkably illuminating.
Sinicizing Mazrui
Mazrui once outlined five different approaches to the study of political theory. The fifth, in particular, reflected his own approach. It involved removing concepts from their original historical context and applying them to new circumstances in order both to illuminate contemporary realities and test the continuing vitality of theory. Or, as Mazrui (1963: 122) himself put it:
We could tear a theory out of its historical context and bring the logic of all or some of its ideas to bear on a specific situation in perhaps our own time – the object of the exercise being to determine whether the ideas scattered within the theory help in the understanding of the situation, on the one hand, and on the other, whether the situation could lend a new depth to the theory or perhaps expose an old shallowness in it.
He also consistently practiced what he had preached. As Mazrui (2012) reminded us:
I demonstrated how Edmond Burke, J. J. Rouseau, and V. I. Lenin could be made more relevant for Africa…I applied Burke’s philosophy to an African situation…I also used in an African context J. J. Rousseau’s philosophical distinction between the general will of all as applied to a postcolonial society. All these were efforts [to make Western ideas relevant for Africa] without necessarily disengaging from the global heritage.
In the following paragraphs, we shall adopt precisely this very approach. In other words, rather than limiting ourselves to what Mazrui explicitly wrote about China, we will apply a few of his broader conceptual categories to contemporary Sino-African relations. But, one may ask, why should we bother to adapt old concepts (developed, for instance, for analyzing the relationship between Africa and the West) for new issues (Sino-African relations). As if in anticipation of this very question, Mazrui (1976; also see Adem 2017: 243-259) had said: “The Chinese emergence as a world power poses for [… ] Africa questions that, though different, are not entirely unrelated to those which arose in the initial waves of Europe’s penetration of the African continent.”
Mazrui’s famous concept of Africa’s Triple Heritage provides an important starting point. Originally referring to the interaction among indigenous African traditions, Islam, and the West, the framework can be expanded analytically. China may one day constitute what might be described as Africa’s Fourth Heritage. But, unlike Europe, China generally exports infrastructure to Africa rather than religion. Unlike the United States, it rarely promotes liberal democracy. Unlike earlier colonial powers, it emphasizes development partnerships while officially maintaining principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Whether this fourth heritage becomes mutually beneficial depends largely upon Africa’s capacity to negotiate from positions of institutional strength.
Mazrui’s three historical phases – pan-pigmentationalism, pan-proletarianism, pan-socialism – adequately explain the period between Bandung and the late 1970s. Yet China’s contemporary engagement requires a fourth stage. We propose the concept of pan-developmentalism. The organizing principle of contemporary Sino-African relations is no longer race, economic solidarity, or socialism. It is development. Infrastructure, industrialization, technology transfer, logistics, energy, and manufacturing now constitute the primary language of cooperation. Development has become the new basis of solidarity. Unlike pan-socialism, pan-developmentalism is largely ideologically neutral. China cooperates with countries that have vastly different political systems. This represents one of the defining characteristics of twenty-first-century Sino-African relations.
An alternative possibility is pan-globalism. China’s Belt and Road Initiative reflects ambitions extending beyond bilateral engagement. It seeks to integrate Africa into new global production networks, transportation corridors, digital infrastructures, and financial institutions. Where pan-developmentalism emphasizes economic modernization, pan-globalism highlights China’s vision of an interconnected international order. Future historians may conclude that contemporary Sino-African relations represent elements of both.
One of the most remarkable features of Mazrui’s engagement with China was his capacity to anticipate future developments. Writing decades before Deng Xiaoping’s reforms transformed China, Mazrui suggested that ideological moderation would eventually supersede revolutionary radicalism. Mazrui (1976: 22) observed:
ideological and diplomatic shifts could make China after Mao similar to Egypt after Nasser… Chou En-Lai—with his vision of an industrialized and stabilized China—might turn out to be of longer-term policy relevance for his country than the legacy of Mao himself.
On China’s imminent rise as a superpower, Mazrui (1973: 154) also wrote: “…before long the question was bound to be asked whether China belonged to the ranks of the weak and underprivileged or was about to join the ranks of the powerful.” It is remarkable to note that Mazrui posed both of the above questions half a decade before Deng Xiaoping opened up China for business – a process that unleashed it as a rising global power. China’s subsequent trajectory closely resembled Mazrui’s predictions as economic modernization replaced revolutionary export; industrialization supplanted ideological mobilization.
China and the Future International Order: A Conclusion
Ali Mazrui also anticipated debates surrounding China’s emergence as a global power. Mazrui (1976) warned, as we saw above, that China’s rise posed questions comparable, though not identical, to those raised by Europe’s earlier expansion into Africa. The comparison was carefully qualified. China’s challenge was not colonialism in the classical European sense. Rather, it concerned the ethical responsibilities accompanying great-power status. A year before his death, Mazrui (2013) reflected once more on China’s future in Africa. He rejected predictions that China would simply reproduce European colonialism. China, Mazrui (2013) argued, was unlikely to impose its language, religion, or educational institutions as in nineteenth-century Europe. Its influence would instead be predominantly economic.
Nevertheless, he cautioned against complacency. Economic engagement could still become exploitative unless African governments negotiated strategically. Such a balanced assessment captures the enduring value of Mazrui’s scholarship. He was neither a Sinophile nor a Sinophobe. He rejected both triumphalist celebrations and alarmist predictions. Instead, he approached China through the broader concerns that animated his entire intellectual career: power without domination, modernization without cultural subordination, and international cooperation grounded in mutual dignity rather than dependency. Mazrui’s writings on China and Africa therefore deserve scholarly attention not simply as historical commentary but as an enduring theoretical resource. By combining postcolonial sensitivity with comparative analysis, Mazrui developed conceptual tools that illuminate China’s evolving relationship with Africa. In the final international lecture he delivered before his death, Ali Mazrui (2013) reflected not on the triumphs of globalization but on its deepest moral deficiency. His concluding words were both a diagnosis of the present and a challenge for the future:
Is a globalized Planet Earth really a global village? The world may be globalized—but what would make it villagized? There is something missing—the compassion of the village has yet to be globalized. Planet Earth will never really become a global village until the contraction of distance is accompanied by the expansion of empathy. Will China become a softer superpower than the United States?
References
Adem, Seifudein. 2017. “Was Mazrui Ahead of His Time?” In Critical Perspectives on Culture and Globalization: The Intellectual Legacy of Ali Mazrui, edited by Kimani Njogu and Seifudein Adem, 243–259. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications.
Adem, Seifudein. 2021. Postcolonial Constructivism: Mazrui’s Theory of Intercultural Relations. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1963. “Edmund Burke and Reflections on the Revolution in the Congo.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (2): 121–133.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1967. “Edmund Burke and Reflections on the Revolution.” In On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship: Essays on Independent Africa, 3–34. London: Longmans.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1973. “The Yellow Man’s Burden: Race and Revolution in Sino-African Relations.” In China and the World Community, edited by Ian Wilson, 181–205. Sydney and London: Angus and Robertson.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1976. “The Chinese Model and the Soviet Model in Eastern and Southern Africa: Strategies of Liberation and Development.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the University Social Science Council for Eastern Africa, University of Dar es Salaam, December 20–22.
Mazrui, Ali A. 2012. “Occupying the Academy.” Acceptance Address of the Distinguished Scholar Award from the Global South Caucus, 53rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 1-4.
Mazrui, Ali A. 2013. “Ibn Khaldun Modernized: Between Nationalism and Globalization.” Third International Ibn Khaldun Symposium hosted by the International Ibn Khaldun Society, Alliance of Civilizations Institute at Fatih Sultan Mehmet Waqf University, Istanbul, Turkey, September 27.
Mazrui, Ali A. 2016. “The Yellow Man’s Burden? Race and Revolution in Sino-African Relations.” In China’s Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa, edited by Seifudein Adem, 1–25. London: Routledge.
Mazrui, Ali A., and Seifudein Adem. 2013. Afrasia: A Tale of Two Continents. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
