Key Findings
The research team found the following:
- The supply chains of critical electrical equipment at the generation and transmission levels needed to power AI energy expansion are vulnerable.
- Off-grid and BP strategies looking to bypass existing constraints on the power grid still rely on many of the same vulnerable components needed for grid-connected projects and therefore do not eliminate supply chain bottlenecks.
- In 2025, generation components generally appeared to be more vulnerable than transmission components, reflecting more-concentrated markets and greater exposure to supply disruptions.
- Vulnerability levels vary substantially across components, suggesting that policy responses should be targeted.
- Under illustrative threat scenarios, supply chain disruptions affecting key FTM components could reduce available net capacity by roughly 7 percent to 31 percent by 2030 relative to a no-additional-delay base case.[2]
- Supply chain disruptions affecting key BTM battery components could reduce available effective generation capacity by about 8 percent by 2030.
Artificial intelligence (AI) development is rapidly increasing electricity demand, especially through the growth of frontier data centers. Expanding the power supply depends on the availability of critical electrical equipment at the transmission and generation levels—much of which is sourced through complex global supply chains. In August 2026, the White House underscored the urgency of this issue in Executive Order 14421 by declaring a national emergency concerning threats to the U.S. bulk-power system associated with foreign-produced electrical equipment and explicitly linking those risks to rising electricity demand from AI and data centers.
RAND researchers examined how supply chain vulnerabilities could affect the equipment needed to power frontier AI data centers and, in turn, the U.S. power system’s ability to meet AI demand by 2030. They assessed the components required for front-of-the-meter (FTM), behind-the-meter (BTM), and bridge-power (BP) energy systems; developed a composite indicator of supply chain vulnerability; and estimated how selected disruptions triggered by supply chain vulnerabilities could reduce available capacity.
What RAND Studied
To examine how supply chain vulnerabilities could affect energy expansion for AI, RAND researchers constructed an inventory of the electrical equipment needed across three broad system types:
-
FTM—grid-connected generation and transmission infrastructure -
BTM—on-site systems, such as batteries and related equipment -
BP—interim on-site generation systems intended to provide power before full grid service is available.[1]
The researchers then evaluated the supply chain vulnerability of critical components using a composite indicator that incorporated several factors, including supplier concentration, number of importers, trade volatility, and evidence of declining imports. Finally, they used case studies and threat scenarios to estimate how supply chain-triggered equipment disruptions could affect available energy capacity by 2030.
Off-Grid Approaches Do Not Eliminate Supply Chain Constraints
One common assumption is that data center developers can avoid grid bottlenecks by moving off-grid or relying on BP solutions. But RAND’s analysis suggests that this strategy does not remove supply chain constraints. Many of the same components required for FTM systems are also needed for BP and some BTM configurations, particularly generation-related equipment.
This means that off-grid approaches may help address some permitting, interconnection, or transmission constraints, but they do not fully avoid equipment shortages, import disruptions, or concentrated supplier markets. In some cases, they may simply shift dependence from one vulnerable set of components to another.
Generation Components Show Greater Supply Chain Vulnerability Than Transmission Components
Across the 2025 assessment, generation components generally ranked as more vulnerable than transmission components. This pattern appears to reflect the specialized nature of generation technologies, the smaller number of producers for some key inputs, and greater sensitivity to import volatility and supply disruptions.
By contrast, transmission-related components also face vulnerabilities, but these were generally less severe in the report’s composite scoring. This distinction matters because many strategies for meeting AI-related electricity demand depend on generation equipment that may be harder to source quickly and reliably, regardless of grid integration status (see Table 1).
Supply Chain Risks Could Materially Reduce Available Capacity by 2030
RAND researchers also examined how selected supply chain threats could affect the power system’s ability to meet AI demand. They found that disruptions affecting key FTM generation components could reduce available net generation capacity by roughly 7 percent to 31 percent by 2030, depending on the scenario and assumptions used. For BTM systems, disruptions affecting battery-related components could reduce effective generation capacity by about 8 percent by 2030, relative to a no-additional-delay base case.
Supply chain disruptions could have system-level consequences large enough to matter for planning, siting, and timing decisions tied to AI infrastructure expansion.
Why Supply Chain Vulnerability Differs Across Components
Not all critical electrical equipment faces the same level or type of supply chain risk. Some components appear to be vulnerable because production is concentrated among a small number of suppliers or countries. Others are exposed to volatile import volumes, price spikes, or signs of declining availability.
This variation suggests that the problem is not a single, broad shortage that can be solved with one generic policy response. Some components may call for better market monitoring, others for diversification or stockpiling, and still others for substitution, standardization, or domestic industrial support.
Policy Implications
Efforts to expand the energy supply for AI should address equipment bottlenecks as seriously as generation and transmission build-out. The research team’s analysis led to the following policy implications:
- Adopt a tiered response framework so that policymakers can match interventions to the type, magnitude, and persistence of observed supply chain vulnerabilities.
- Prioritize the most-vulnerable generation components, which show higher supply chain risk than transmission equipment and affect both grid-connected and off-grid solutions.
- Improve monitoring of critical equipment markets by increasing the granularity of trade data for such components as turbines and transformers.
- Enhance supply chain visibility through reasonable reporting and mapping requirements for the sourcing and handling of key electrical equipment.
- Consider developing strategic reserves for critical components that combine high vulnerability with high system importance.
- Promote greater standardization of key equipment to reduce concentration risks and expand sourcing flexibility.
- Improve coordination between utilities and large loads so that demand forecasting and procurement planning better reflect emerging AI-related electricity needs.
- Encourage the substitution of less vulnerable technologies when alternative components or storage chemistries can reduce exposure to supply shocks.
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Citation
RAND Style Manual
Arciniegas Rueda, Ismael E. and Robin Wang, Supply Chain Vulnerabilities May Worsen Critical Electrical Equipment Bottlenecks, Further Delaying the U.S. Ability to Power AI Energy Expansion, RAND Corporation, RB-A4707-1, 2026. As of November 17, 2026:
Chicago Manual of Style
Arciniegas Rueda, Ismael E. and Robin Wang, Supply Chain Vulnerabilities May Worsen Critical Electrical Equipment Bottlenecks, Further Delaying the U.S. Ability to Power AI Energy Expansion. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. .
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