Abstract
This article draws on Civil Affairs support to US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan in maintaining a commander’s freedom of action by helping mitigate the unintended civil consequences of military operations. It examines consequence management as part of a broader process of assessment, culturally informed engagement, coordination, and command involvement. This article also argues that lessons learned from Afghanistan remain relevant to future operations, where anticipating and responding to civil consequences can help prevent tactical actions from creating subsequent operational constraints.
Introduction
Operations in Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) demonstrated how tactical actions can produce consequences that extend well beyond the immediate mission. Airstrikes sometimes resulted in civilian casualties, as seen in 2008 when members of a wedding party traveling on foot were killed in an airstrike. Similarly, military raids sometimes struck the wrong house, which resulted in civilian casualties that, in some cases, left families without their primary providers. Even if no one was injured, these raids would still damage doors, windows, and other property. In other cases, forces successfully detained the intended target but removed the household’s primary provider responsible for maintaining the family’s property and livelihood. For the military force, the operation might have ended when they met their objectives and returned to base. However, for the affected family and surrounding community, the consequences of that operation had only begun.
During GWOT, commanders recognized the importance of managing the civil consequences of their military operations to maintain relationships and freedom of action on the battlefield. Civil Affairs (CA) forces contributed to this effort by identifying, assessing, and mitigating effects within the civil environment of their area of operations. Moreover, supporting US Special Operations Forces through consequence management in Afghanistan demonstrated how addressing civilian harm served an operational purpose beyond humanitarian assistance. In addition, when military representatives acknowledged harm and addressed damages from military operations, it sometimes helped preserve relationships with local leaders, mitigate grievances, and reduce the likelihood that the civil consequences of tactical actions would constrain subsequent operations.
Freedom of Action and the Civil Environment
During operations in Afghanistan, commanders sought to maintain freedom of action to preserve the initiative and accomplish their missions. Although Joint and Army doctrine do not provide a distinct doctrinal definition of freedom of action, both consistently treat it as a condition that commanders seek to preserve to employ forces, exploit opportunities, and continue operations despite constraints. However, these constraints are not limited to enemy action, terrain, logistics, or operational access. In operations conducted among civilian populations, conditions within the civil environment can also constrain a commander’s freedom of action.
Consequences in the civil environment resulting from military operations can restrict a commander’s ability to allow their units to operate freely. Operations that cause civilian casualties, for example, can contribute to grievances among the population and damage relationships between military forces and local communities. For example, in March 2007, hundreds of Afghans protested near Jalalabad after civilians were killed along a roadway as US Special Operations Forces responded to an attack. The demonstrations disrupted traffic along a major highway, illustrating how the effects of a tactical engagement could extend into the surrounding civil environment. Similarly, in April 2007, following a raid that resulted in several civilian casualties, hundreds of Afghans protested, and members of the Shinwar tribe threatened to deny US-led and NATO forces access to their district to pursue the Taliban. Such incidents involving civilians illustrate how the consequences of tactical actions can migrate from the battlefield into the civil environment and potentially constrain a commander’s freedom of action for subsequent operations.
As operations continued in Afghanistan, commanders increasingly had to address the unintended civil consequences of their military operations. Moreover, the negative effects from civilian casualties, injuries, and other issues such as property damage contributed to the grievances and strained relationships with local communities. Consequence management at the time gave commanders a way to address these effects, with condolence and solatia payments serving as tools to acknowledge civilian harm and express sympathy to affected civilians and their families. By 2005, US forces in Afghanistan were using both forms of payment for deaths, injuries, and property damage resulting from US or coalition combat operations.
Consequence Management in Afghanistan
For CA forces supporting US Special Operations Forces, consequence management often began after the tactical operation had ended. This could occur immediately following an operation or the next day, when CA personnel coordinated with conventional forces and local leaders in the affected area. Through engagement with local communities and those directly affected, CA personnel sought to understand local perceptions of the incident, identify those who had been impacted, and assess the broader consequences of the operation within the civil environment.
More importantly, these engagements contributed to commanders’ decisions on how to respond to the consequences of an operation. Having CA forces on the ground provided commanders with a dedicated capability to assess the effects of their operations within the civil environment and better inform an appropriate response to mitigate any negative effects. These assessments included documenting property damage, identifying civilian casualties, and understanding how the loss of a family member affected a household’s livelihood. This information provided commanders with a more complete understanding of the unintended consequences of an operation beyond its immediate tactical effects.
The information gathered through these engagements informed the command’s response to the incident. Depending on the extent of civilian harm or property damage, some payments were made directly to those affected by the incident. However, more significant incidents required coordination with higher headquarters legal staff and commander approval. In Afghanistan, certain approval authorities were delegated to the O-5 level, allowing decisions and payments to occur relatively quickly. Within the supported US Special Operations Forces units, short lines of communication between CA personnel, staff, and commanders further facilitated timely decisions. This responsiveness mattered because delays in addressing civilian harm or property damage could allow grievances in communities to intensify and potentially complicate subsequent operations.
Therefore, condolence and solatia payments were tools within a broader consequence management process available to commanders. The engagements surrounding these payments provided CA personnel opportunities to better understand the civil environment, engage affected families and local leaders, and address consequences that could potentially restrict the freedom of action of US Special Operations Forces. Despite the circumstances, these efforts also gave US Special Operations Forces opportunities to coordinate with conventional forces operating in the affected area, whose relationships with local communities could likewise be influenced by the consequences of their operations. Notably, the process provided commanders a means to acknowledge civilian harm caused by their operations, demonstrate responsiveness to affected communities and neighboring military units, and mitigate consequences that could otherwise affect any subsequent operations in the area.
The Operational Value of Engagement
Above all, the operational value of condolence payments extended beyond their monetary value because the consequence management process created opportunities for direct engagement between military forces and those local communities affected by their operations. In Afghanistan, condolence payments served as expressions of sympathy for civilian death, injury, or property damage resulting from US or coalition combat operations and were generally delivered through personal visits to affected individuals or families. These engagements also included culturally appropriate gestures of condolence or reconciliation depending on local customs and the circumstances surrounding the incident.
One example of a culturally appropriate gesture of condolence occurred in April 2010, when Vice Adm. William McRaven, commander of Joint Special Operations Command at the time, personally visited an Afghan family whose two sons, two daughters, and grandchild had been killed during a US Special Operations raid near Gardez. As part of an Afghan reconciliation practice, McRaven brought two sheep to present to the father of those killed in the operation. As the senior commander, he also publicly acknowledged that forces under his command were responsible for the deaths, offered his condolences, and asked the family for forgiveness. At the end, the family members appreciated his visit and publicly accepted his apology.
Although McRaven’s engagement occurred at a much higher command level than those typically conducted by CA personnel, it showed how culturally informed engagement can help repair relationships and mitigate the unintended consequences of military operations. However, commanders and staff had to understand and consider local customs and cultural expectations to identify the appropriate response. In some Afghan communities, particularly those influenced by Pashtun customary practices, culturally appropriate gestures or in-kind assistance provided an alternative to the typical monetary payments. McRaven’s presentation of livestock to the family provides a good example of how understanding local culture could shape how military forces acknowledged harm and engaged affected families.
Ultimately, the operational value of these engagements extended beyond the monetary payment or culturally appropriate gesture itself. The consequence management process provided CA personnel with opportunities to engage with locals affected by military operations to better understand grievances, acknowledge the consequences of military operations, and help commanders determine an appropriate response. These activities could not guarantee that damaged relationships with local communities would be repaired or that their views of US operations would improve. Nevertheless, timely engagement gave commanders a way to mitigate unintended consequences that could damage local relationships, reduce cooperation, and potentially constrain subsequent operations. In this way, consequence management helped maintain freedom of action by addressing the negative effects of military operations that persisted after the tactical mission ended.
Limits of Consequence Management
Unfortunately, consequence management in Afghanistan did not guarantee that the effects of civilian harm caused by military operations could be resolved. Condolence payments provided by US forces could compensate for certain material losses or serve as expressions of sympathy to those family members and communities. Still, they could not restore a life, eliminate grievances, or ensure that damaged relationships with local communities would be repaired. The effectiveness of these efforts depended in part on how quickly military forces responded, whether the response reflected local circumstances and cultural expectations, and whether commanders viewed the payment as one component of a broader effort to maintain relationships rather than simply the conclusion following a specific incident. Moreover, the available evidence does not establish a direct causal relationship between condolence payments or other consequence management activities and the preservation of freedom of action.
As seen during US operations in Afghanistan, organizational and procedural limitations further complicated consequence management efforts. In 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found inconsistent reporting among military units because the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance did not clearly distinguish which property damage should be categorized as a condolence payment or a battle-damage payment. DoD also lacked centralized access to some of the detailed information needed to verify and analyze individual payments across the force. However, these challenges were not unique to the early years of Afghanistan. A more recent DoD-sponsored RAND assessment found that US responses to civilian harm, including ex gratia payments, remained inconsistent across conflicts and at times produced unintended consequences. These longstanding challenges contributed to DoD’s subsequent efforts to standardize civilian-harm reporting, assessments, data management, and mechanisms for responding to affected civilians. Consequently, the historical data collected provides substantial evidence of how US forces administered condolence payments but a more limited basis for determining their effects on local relationships, grievances, or subsequent military operations.
These limitations reinforce why payments used as part of consequence management should not be viewed simply as a transactional response to civilian harm. Although available evidence does not measure the extent to which condolence payments or other consequence management activities helped preserve freedom of action. That does not mean US forces have no moral obligation to address unintended consequences caused by their operations. Moreover, consequence management’s potential contribution to freedom of action still depended on timely assessment, culturally informed engagement, command involvement, and continued attention to an operation’s consequences after the tactical mission had ended.
Lessons for Future Operations
The lessons learned from managing civilian harm and other consequences extend beyond the conflict in Afghanistan. Future large-scale combat operations and other limited operations conducted alongside allies and partners will occur in complex civil environments where tactical actions can produce unintended consequences. Although consequence management mechanisms and operational context will differ, the lessons learned from this conflict remain useful. For example, commanders must understand how the potential negative effects of military operations on civilian populations can influence subsequent operations. Therefore, US forces across all branches should incorporate the lessons learned from consequence management in Afghanistan into how they prepare commanders and staffs to anticipate, assess, and respond to civilian harm in future conflicts.
First, commanders and staffs should proactively plan for potential unintended civil consequences during the military planning process. Including CA personnel in the planning process can also help staff better understand the civil environment, identify populations and infrastructure that military actions could affect, and consider how those potential consequences could influence subsequent operations. DoD’s current Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response framework provides an institutional foundation for this approach by integrating civilian harm considerations into doctrine, planning, training, exercises, and professional military education. Anticipating potential civil consequences before an operation may give commanders greater opportunity to mitigate civilian harm while preserving freedom of action for subsequent operations.
Second, commanders should maintain a capability to rapidly assess and respond to unintended civil consequences when they occur. In Afghanistan, CA personnel supporting US Special Operations Forces would engage affected communities and local leaders, coordinate with conventional forces operating in the area, assess the consequences of an operation, and provide commanders with information to inform an appropriate response. Future large-scale combat operations may make this type of direct engagement conducted by CA personnel more difficult because of the scale, tempo, and contested nature of the operational environment. Nevertheless, commanders will still require timely information about how military actions affect the civil environment and how those effects could influence subsequent operations. Maintaining the capability to rapidly assess unintended consequences and communicate that information to commanders can provide the decision space necessary to respond before those consequences create additional operational constraints.
Third, consequence management should not be reduced to only condolence payments or a transactional response to civilian harm. Although monetary or in-kind assistance could address certain material losses or express sympathy to those affected by the operation, the engagement surrounding the response provides an opportunity to better understand local grievances and determine whether additional actions are necessary. Therefore, commanders should view compensation as one component of a broader effort to understand and mitigate unintended consequences rather than as the conclusion following an incident.
Fourth, commanders should recognize that the unintended civil consequences of military operations may extend beyond the unit that caused them. During operations in Afghanistan, the consequences of a US Special Operations Forces operation did not necessarily remain with the Special Operations element that conducted the operation. Conventional forces responsible for the affected area could inherit resulting grievances and damaged relationships with local communities after the Special Operations element departed. In future operations, the effects of a tactical action could similarly affect other US units, allies and partners, host-nation authorities, or the broader joint force. These consequences may also extend beyond the immediate geographic area as information about civilian harm spreads through traditional and social media platforms. Additionally, CA forces can help bridge these organizational boundaries by assessing civil consequences, sharing information across affected units, and coordinating responses within the civil environment. Consequently, consequence management should be viewed as a shared operational responsibility that requires coordination across units and organizations to mitigate civil consequences that could otherwise constrain the broader force’s freedom of action.
Conclusion
The experience of CA forces supporting US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan demonstrates why commanders must consider these civil consequences as part of military operations. CA personnel at the time provided commanders with a capability to assess the effects of their operations, engage affected populations and local leaders, coordinate with other forces, and inform appropriate responses. Although condolence payments were only one tool within this broader process, the payment itself was never the most important lesson in the process. The larger lesson was the need to understand the local grievances within the communities affected and address the unintended consequences that tactical actions created within the civil environment.
It is important to note that future conflicts will differ significantly from Afghanistan, and the mechanisms used to respond to civilian harm will likely evolve over time. However, the fundamental challenges US forces faced on the ground during GWOT still remain relevant. Tactical actions can create unintended civil consequences that affect relationships, cooperation, access, and risk subsequent military operations. US forces across all branches do not need to rediscover these lessons learned in the next conflict. Above all, maintaining freedom of action for subsequent operations requires commanders to consider not only how a specific operation achieves its objective, but also what unintended effects remain on the ground after the force departs. Hence, the operation is not completely over because the tactical mission met its military objective.
