On January 9, Japan’s Cabinet Office released survey data showing that 68.3% of respondents broadly backed promoting defense equipment exports under certain rules, with the survey question specifically citing Tokyo’s Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.
The government-implemented poll,[1] which surveyed 3,000 Japanese nationals aged 18 and over and received 1,534 responses between November 6 and December 14, 2025, coincides with the Sanae Takaichi administration’s policy direction toward the relaxation of key restrictions on the export of Japanese defense equipment in fiscal 2026.
Under the Japanese government’s current legal and policy framework, such exports are, in principle, limited to five designated uses: rescue, transportation, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. These so-called “Five Categories,” which restrict exports based on the intended use of the equipment, are the constraints the Takaichi government has proposed to abolish.
About the “Five Categories”
Under Japan’s Three Principles, the export of “finished products” (i.e. whole systems, rather than parts or components) is, in principle, permitted only when their intended use falls within the five categories set out in the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles, last amended in March 2024 under the Fumio Kishida government.[2]
https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/r51222_bouei6.pdf
As shown in the table above, the framework includes several qualifications and key exceptions in which Japanese finished defense equipment may be exported outside the strict activity limits of the five categories.
Within the five-category framework, defense systems provided to other countries to support activities related to the five categories may incorporate weapons systems, where such arms are necessary for self-protection or required to perform essential duties related to those activities.
Finished defense equipment incorporating arms may be transferred outside the five categories when it is jointly developed and produced with a partner country, provided that appropriate arrangements are established on a project-by-project basis. A key example of such joint development and production is Japan’s Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Italy and the United Kingdom, a project aimed at developing a next-generation fighter aircraft.
Separately, defense equipment and technology that fall outside the five categories may be transferred to countries “facing aggression in violation of international law, use of force or threat of force”, a pathway first applied exclusively to Ukraine and subsequently expanded. However, transfers under this provision are limited to non-lethal equipment, as exemplified by Tokyo’s transfer of transport vehicles and personal equipment to Ukraine.
The Sanae Takaichi Administration’s Approach
Within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) now led by Prime Minister Takaichi, there has long been a view that the five categories should be abolished. Proponents argue that the restrictions have led Japan’s private sector to focus almost solely on supplying defense equipment to the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and that abolishing them would lift constraints on exports and support the broader development of Japan’s defense industry.[3]
The Takaichi government’s intention to abolish the five categories was first revealed in a coalition agreement reached in late October last year between Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its partner, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party).[4]
That intention was reinforced publicly in December, when reports indicated that the ruling parties were expected to seek the understanding of opposition parties ahead of compiling a proposal to scrap the five categories as early as February 2026.[5]
Defense Industrial Reaction to the Proposed Abolition
The mooted move to abolish the five categories has been welcomed by key U.S. defense primes, with Northrop Grumman’s CEO having noted last October that Japan’s relaxation of its export rules would make it easier for the two allies to work together in exporting the defense equipment they develop jointly more widely.
Within Japan, one prime contractor to comment on the government’s proposed changes is the telecommunications giant, NEC Corporation. In an interview with Nikkei this month, the firm’s President and CEO, Takayuki Morita, assessed that the lifting of the five categories could lead to additional orders for the telecommunications firm.[6]
At the same time, Morita nevertheless indicated that NEC’s core strengths are not overly constrained by the five-category rule, pointing to the prime’s capabilities in non-lethal systems such as sonar, air traffic control, communications technologies, and air defense systems.
Conclusions
Such private-sector assessments are likely shared across Japan’s defense industry, where companies have long specialized in defensive-oriented systems as an export niche shaped by long-standing stringent legislative restrictions, but now increasingly see opportunities to expand into new areas.
While the ruling LDP and its Nippon Ishin coalition partner had previously floated February 2026 as a target for introducing a proposal to abolish the five categories, the initiative’s prospects will now depend on the political landscape following the general election scheduled for February 8.
Notes
[1] Cabinet Public Relations Office, “「自衛隊・防衛問題に関する世論調査（速報）」” [“Public opinion poll on the Japan Self-Defense Forces and defense issues (preliminary report)”]. January 9, 2026, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/202601/r07/r07-bousai/gairyaku_1.pdf.
[2] National Security Council, “Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” (Provisional Translation). Amended on March 26, 2024, https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/policy/pdf/detc_01_02_implementation_guidelines_20240326.pdf.
[3] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “防衛装備品の輸出規制「5類型」とは 救難や輸送用途に限定” [The ‘Five Categories’ Limiting Defense Equipment Exports for Uses such as Rescue and Transport”]. December 3, 2025, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA024MA0S5A201C2000000/.
[4] Mizuki Sato, “LDP begins talks on revising nation’s security documents”. Asahi Shimbun, November 20, 2025, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16170813.
[5] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “防衛装備品の輸出制限撤廃、自民・小野寺氏「野党の意見受け議論」” [LDP’s Onodera: “Discussions to be held based on opinions of opposition parties” regarding lifting export restrictions on defense equipment], December 21, 2025, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA210C00R21C25A2000000/.
[6] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “NEC森田隆之社長、防衛装備品の輸出「市場開拓で協力する」” [NEC President Takayuki Morita: “We will cooperate in developing new markets for defense equipment exports”], January 8, 2026, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC271ND0X21C25A2000000/.
This article was originally posted on NSBT Japan, the first defense and security industry network in Japan. The publication provides the latest information on security business trends both within Japan and overseas. Asian Military Review began exchanging articles with NSBT Japan in April 2024.
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