On September 21, José Luis Pérez Villanueva, better known as “El Cholo”—the second-in-command and financial architect of the criminal group Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra Nevada—was killed during a Colombian police operation on the rural outskirts of Santa Marta. Within hours, militants from that organization launched a dramatic campaign of terror. The group, known colloquially as Los Pachenca, demanded that businesses across the city shutter. Some 90 percent of shops did, as videos circulated of gunmen shooting up storefronts that stayed open.
For two decades, Los Pachenca has been the unquestioned criminal authority in the beachfront city and the adjacent Sierra Nevada mountain range, charging extortion payments from businesses and residents and controlling the flow of drugs out of the Port of Santa Marta, en route to Europe and beyond. But the level of control the group exhibited during the strike was particularly jarring, given that Santa Marta is the vacation home of many of the country’s elite and a common destination for international visitors. Colombia’s government responded by militarizing the city, sending in hundreds of soldiers and police officers, who rolled into town on the main highway with tanks and air support. Many shops still stayed closed until the morning of September 25, when the group announced that it was ending the strike. For locals, Los Pachenca’s reaction was a message about who remains in charge.
Calm has since returned to Santa Marta, but the incident may be indicative of risks to come. Colombia’s newly elected president, Abelardo de la Espriella, has promised a steep military escalation against illegal groups, which have grown precipitously in recent years. As he does so, armed and criminal organizations will undoubtedly respond. Often, their target will not be the state. Instead, they will likely direct their violence against the civilian populations, whom they have spent years coopting and coercing. That is because armed and criminal groups across the country have learned that their true leverage is their ability to govern local communities—and to intimidate and punish them into silence. Even when they do attack state forces, their use of weapons such as improvised explosives and makeshift drones means that bystanders often suffer. In one recent incident in the Pacific coast department of Valle del Cauca, four drone attacks launched by an armed group in a single day left five civilians injured.
These dangers are particularly acute as de la Espriella’s pledge of a zero-tolerance crackdown against armed and criminal groups has won enthusiastic support from Washington. Both countries want big and visible victories against these outfits. They triumphantly announced a new era of cooperation when the president took office in August, including a promise of upgraded military ties. (The United States has not yet publicly pledged new weapons, but it is already providing greater intelligence and logistical assistance on some operations.) After two years of tensions and threats between President Donald Trump and leftist former President Gustavo Petro, the political realignment means that Colombia is once again the United States’ closest defense ally in South America. This is likely to continue, despite major Democratic wins in the U.S. Congress, as the relationship’s focus on security has a long history of bipartisan support.
This week, during U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s visit to Bogotá, the de la Espriella administration signaled that it would seek congressional approval for joint military operations with the United States in Colombia. This cooperation will likely yield initial results. The Colombian government has said that it aims to ramp up attacks against armed and criminal groups and to go after leaders who enjoyed protection as counterparts in peace talks during the past administration.
Yet Colombia’s true challenge is not how to carry out attacks but what to do afterward. Surgical strikes, which see the military enter and exit quickly, leave civilians more vulnerable in the aftermath, as armed groups retaliate against alleged informants and tighten their grip in areas they control. Bogotá must ensure that every operation includes contingencies to anticipate criminal groups’ reactions and build on successful offensives by weakening their grasp on communities. The government will need to strengthen the police’s ability to patrol contested areas, a costly but necessary process that the United States and other partners should support.
The stakes are high. Bogotá has a chance to leverage its increased military pressure to open the door for the state, rewriting the story of who governs conflict areas. If the government misses this opportunity to consolidate state control, however, Colombia risks entering an escalatory spiral in which civilians pay a mounting price for a campaign intended to protect them.
MANO DURA
Armed and criminal groups have spent the last decade expanding their reach across Colombia. According to the local think tank Pares, the number of municipalities with an armed group presence rose from 212 in 2018 to 518 last year—or about half of all municipalities. This deterioration reversed dramatic and hard-won improvements in security. After the historically violent decades of the 1990s and 2000s, military pressure and negotiations yielded a 2016 peace agreement demobilizing the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), once the country’s dominant rebel group. Colombia’s countryside breathed a sigh of relief as the FARC pulled out of areas where it had been in control, which represented a quarter of the country’s land.
The FARC’s exit, however, did not pave the way for Colombia’s highly centralized and bureaucratic state to claim control of those vast geographies. Instead, old armed groups such as the National Liberation Army and newer ones such as the Gaitanista Army of Colombia (also known as the Gulf Clan) saw a chance to expand their access to trafficking routes, coca crops, illegal mines, and, ultimately, vulnerable rural populations. Kidnapping for extortion and mass displacement began to resurface, shattering optimism that progress would move in one direction. Over the last four years, membership in illegal groups has nearly doubled, to some 27,000 fighters today.
As a candidate, de la Espriella successfully harnessed public frustration by promising mano dura, or iron-fisted tactics, including aerial attacks and increased incarceration, facilitated by the construction of mega-prisons. He blamed his predecessor’s administration for accelerating insecurity. The first leftist to be elected president in modern Colombia, Petro had entered office in 2022 vowing to de-emphasize the military’s role and instead hold peace talks with various armed organizations. But not every group participated, and many of the ones that did sought to take advantage of cease-fires to cement their control over communities. Midway through his term, Petro pivoted back toward deploying the armed forces. But much of the harm was already done.
Colombia’s new president has been in office only a little more than 100 days, but the shift is marked. De la Espriella carried out three bombing raids in his first weeks. He has extradited dozens of individuals to the United States, including senior leaders, and the administration has killed or captured many others. The president is doggedly pushing to restart aerial fumigation of coca crops, which the state carried out in the early 2000s to try to reduce the number of hectares under cultivation; the practice has since been heavily restricted by court rulings over concerns about health and environmental consequences. Both in private and in public, military leaders laud the government’s new support for their operations.
Colombia is once again the United States’ closest defense ally in South America.
The Trump administration has also welcomed these developments, which align with a regional trend favoring Washington’s approach on counternarcotics. For Colombia, the new era of security cooperation with the United States represents a return to the status quo ante of the last quarter century, which was briefly disrupted by the Petro administration. U.S.-Colombian military ties were forged through antidrug efforts and deepened in 1999 with Plan Colombia, a decadelong $10 billion aid package that funded, among other things, the expansion and professionalization of the security forces and fumigation. The Colombian police and military are deeply integrated with their American counterparts. They use U.S.- and NATO-compatible systems, travel by the hundreds to the United States each year for instruction, and receive American intelligence. In nearly every operation, at least one step (and often far more) in the logistical chain is either coordinated with Washington or relies on U.S. support. That relationship never fully stopped under Petro, but the two sides were notably wary of each other. Now bilateral trust appears to be restored.
Even before the elections, de la Espriella impressed U.S. officials by outlining his plans to reclaim security momentum for the state. The Colombian president is now acting on several explicit U.S. priorities, including extraditions and legislation to designate numerous groups as terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, Bogotá’s coca eradication targets are even more ambitious than Washington’s. At a personal level, relations are strong, too. Two of Colombia’s top military officials previously served as envoys to U.S. Southern Command.
Bogotá says that it intends to deliver results for Washington’s antidrug goals and has explicitly asked for additional support in the form of funding, aircraft, surveillance technologies, and maintenance. Although Colombia’s military remains among the best trained in the region, its logistical needs are critical. Only 13 of Colombia’s 53 Black Hawk helicopters are in working order, and defense spending has shrunk as a share of the national government’s budget, from 22.4 percent in 2003 to just 14.7 percent in 2025, with a growing proportion of those funds spent on salaries and pensions.
How much the United States will provide remains to be seen. In August, U.S. Southern Command’s General Francis Donovan discussed ways to shore up the deteriorating air fleet during a visit to Bogotá. The United States has also redeployed surveillance drones from Africa to Colombia and Ecuador, where they are already aiding intelligence collection. But Secretary of State Marco Rubio was reluctant to pledge specific aid while in Colombia in September, and most of this assistance is likely to be in kind or to stay in the hands of the U.S. military and contractors, with little entering the Colombian budget. Much of it appears to be focused on short-term offensive wins.
FIGHTING YESTERDAY’S WAR
Colombia has returned to tactics such as aerial bombardment because they arguably worked against the FARC. Founded as a Marxist rebellion in the 1960s, the group behaved like a conventional army, dressed in uniforms, and sought out combat with the state. This meant that the Colombian military could bomb encampments and that capturing leaders left the organization at times rudderless. Slowly chipping away at the FARC’s hierarchy and control helped push the group to finally negotiate its disarmament, beginning in 2012.
But today, those same strategies are yielding diminishing returns. The current generation of armed and criminal groups has little interest in confronting the state. Instead, they behave like businesses, seeking to safeguard access to natural resources, supply chains, and trafficking routes. They live within the civilian population and rarely wear uniforms. Leaders are easily replaced and hierarchies are fluid. Critically, Colombia’s armed groups have learned that wars with the military are costly but that controlling local populations—through intimidation and violence, but also by offering economic incentives, jobs, and services—is comparatively cheap. The battlefield has evolved from a conventional conflict to a contest over who can govern territories and the people living there.
Santa Marta offers an example of how this new model of warfare works. On most days, an outsider in the city would never perceive the presence of Los Pachenca. The group’s members do not patrol or identify themselves. Yet residents know them well from the weekly or monthly extortion payments they are forced to make. Local companies and government officials essentially view the group as an inescapable reality. Pushing back carries a violent price, but paying a protection tax, taking a bribe, or facilitating illegal commerce keeps business running smoothly.
The government’s challenge is not how to carry out attacks but what to do afterward.
The criminal governance of rural areas is even more suffocating. Groups that emerged from splinters of the former FARC, known as dissidents, often force local residents to hold identity cards, issued so that militants have a full census of who lives in the area and can detect possible enemy fighters. In the Amazon region, these groups keep a land registry more complete than that of the state so that they know exactly whom and how much to extort.
With this intense surveillance over society, armed and criminal groups frequently deploy the civilian population as human shields against military offensives and police patrols. The most egregious example is the widespread use of forcibly recruited children as bodyguards for senior commanders. De la Espriella’s initial bombardments, which killed at least six children, were even temporarily halted by a court over concerns about minors. Senior officers admit that these types of casualties are inevitable around high-value targets, and that the groups know that the military is far less likely to proceed if it means killing children.
Armed and criminal groups will also try to use the military operations to their political advantage. When children are killed in bombardments, for example, FARC dissidents spin the local narrative into a story about how the state cares little for rural populations. The argument sticks because there is rarely a credible state presence that can serve and protect these same communities and earn their trust.
There are more immediate consequences, as well. In the aftermath of bombardments and high-level captures, armed and criminal groups often undertake what amounts to a purge of the population, killing or exiling anyone they believe to have collaborated with the state. And when the state takes out a leader, intra-group violence frequently ensues as former associates compete to take his place. Many residents shelter inside to avoid being caught up in the fighting, leaving children without school and parents without income. If new splinter groups emerge, the combat for control over neighborhoods can place even more civilians in the crossfire. This fallout widens the gap between immediate tactical results and long-term security gains. Taking out a senior leader wins applause, but conditions may well worsen on the ground.
FUND THE POLICE
De la Espriella’s administration has rightly identified winning territorial control, permanently dislodging criminal groups, and restoring state governance as its ultimate goals. The dilemma it now faces—exacerbated by U.S. support that focuses on attention-grabbing wins—is how to both achieve short-term results and ensure that these do not unleash new waves of violence, retaliation against civilians, and, in turn, criminal consolidation.
The challenge is twofold. First, the military needs to anticipate groups’ violent reactions and to safeguard the population. In the case of Santa Marta, for example, the government could have increased police presence in the city in the hours after El Cholo was killed. Before the next bombardment or high-level capture, the state should ensure that a ground team of soldiers or military police is ready to hold the ground, protect the community, and prevent the armed group from swiftly stepping back in to reclaim territory.
The second challenge—establishing lasting territorial control—is trickier. A permanent rural security presence might offer the best chance for Colombia’s government to change the direction of the conflict. The country’s military leadership controls only the tip of the spear, not the rest of the state. Time and again, governments “send only the military to the hardest areas,” a retired senior officer told Crisis Group. Moreover, soldiers are operating under heavy pressure for quick wins, which are measured in the number of combatants and especially high-value targets that are killed or captured. There is a real risk that by focusing largely on these statistics, the state will overlook more comprehensive policies necessary to achieve durable security.
Pressure to deliver fast results has in the past incentivized unacceptable practices. In the early 2000s, intense political demands for combat kills fueled elaborate schemes in which soldiers murdered thousands of civilians and counted them as guerrilla fatalities, a scandal known as “false positives.” These crimes deeply compromised public trust in the security forces, and the military has worked for years to build a culture and procedures that ensure they do not happen again. Today, the country’s senior military leadership is likely the first and best brake on any attempts to use excessive force. Commanders say that they are cognizant of the need to guard against rules being slowly stretched until they are broken. “We need a stronger security approach, but it also worries us when we hear there is pressure for ‘results,’” one officer said. But U.S. rhetoric and behavior, including its decision to sink what it claims are drug-smuggling boats on the high seas, compound these risks.
Success, then, may demand a strategy that is ultimately anchored in a much stronger and larger police force, fit for the job of safeguarding civilians rather than merely carrying out offensive strikes. Military operations can generate a window of opportunity by shuffling dynamics on the ground or removing certain dangerous players. Yet those reconfigurations will turn out in the state’s favor only if the resulting vacuum is eventually filled by reliable law enforcement. Take, for example, an operation that temporarily dislodges a group from a rural hamlet. If the military acts alone, it will likely enter and leave in a matter of days or even hours, allowing the armed group to quickly return. If, however, the offensive is followed up with permanent police patrols, access to the justice system, and social interventions, criminals will have a harder time regaining control.
Bogotá cannot afford to repeat past mistakes or ignore how the conflict has changed.
This, of course, is easier said than done, given the government’s resource constraints. To create effective and permanent patrols, police departments operating in the countryside need more officers and equipment to maintain a presence in the most remote communities. Colombia has roughly 180,000 uniformed police officers, a figure that, per capita, puts it on the lower end of OECD countries, many of which are far more urbanized and therefore easier to patrol. In Colombia’s conflict-affected areas, outgunned officers must often stay inside their local stations for their own safety, limiting their ability to build trust and channels of communication with the population. Other state institutions, such as the justice system, say that they cannot establish a durable foothold in villages without guarantees of protection in the medium term—exactly what rural policing should strive to provide. The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has funded the building and equipping of rural police stations in the past; it should expand this work. International partners with long-standing expertise in rural policing, such as Canada and France, could provide critical support, as well.
In cities, the challenge is different. In Santa Marta, for example, the state is present, but it is weak and vulnerable to the pressure and cooptation of the same groups that it must confront. The police need both more officers and better working conditions—including salaries, benefits, access to education, and social support for families—that could help them resist bribes. Regular vetting and counterintelligence checks can help ensure that police are fighting on the side of the state and not its adversaries.
Expanding the police will be an expensive, long-term undertaking. In the interim, Colombia could prioritize more personnel for critical areas and ensure that officers have a strong grounding in community policing, allowing them to understand the most pressing risks facing civilians. That means regular outreach to communities to build trust and make certain that officers are seen as having a stake in local well-being. The United States, meanwhile, must continue to help Bogotá strengthen its police and courts with direct financial and technical assistance.
Colombia, backed by renewed U.S. support, cannot afford to repeat past mistakes or ignore how the conflict has changed. Bogotá must therefore plan for and capitalize on military pressure to do something no government in Colombia’s history has done: govern well in conflict areas.
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