The Secure World Foundation’s 2026 Global Counterspace Capabilities report notes continued efforts to harness electronic warfare for counterspace tasks and missions around the world.
The Secure World Foundation (SWF) is a thinktank with offices in Broomfield, Colorado and Washington DC. The SWF publishes the Global Counterspace Capabilities report annually. The publication has emerged as the preeminent open-source assessment of kinetic, cyber and electronic counterspace research, development and deployment efforts around the globe. Armada’s summary of the 2025 report’s discussion of global counterspace Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities can be found here.
The 2026 edition noted that no major changes have been witnessed regarding the counterspace EW capabilities and postures of Australia and France, but this is not the case for other nations examined therein. For example, France’s neighbour Germany may acquire counterspace EW means in the future: Berlin’s November 2025 Space Safety and Security Strategy called for the establishment of “the capability for comprehensive cyber operations and electromagnetic spectrum operations in the space domain”.
Looking towards the Middle East, as of late April 2026, it is probably too early to state with definitive confidence the extent to which the Islamic Republic of Iran was successful in using counterspace EW capabilities during her conflict with Israel and the United States in March/April. It is known that Iran has successfully deployed Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) jamming systems against Starlink Satellite Communications (SATCOM) terminals. In January 2026, the Iranian authorities directed GNSS PNT jamming against Starlink terminals during nationwide political protests. Starlink terminals are dependent on receiving GNSS PNT signals to function properly.
Interestingly, Iran’s strategic rival Israel has provided some clarity on her GNSS PNT jamming and spoofing activities: Israel made a submission to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in November 2025. The ITU is the United Nations (UN) organisation responsible for the global regulation of the radio spectrum. The submission stated that deliberate PNT interference was only performed in “situations where there was an imminent and verifiable threat to human life or critical national infrastructure, and in such cases (the disruption) did not exceed a duration of 15 minutes”.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not been quite as forthcoming regarding its alleged deliberate GNSS PNT disruption. As the SWF report makes clear, in October 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) passed a resolution specifying that GNSS interference emanating from the DPRK was an infringement of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation. The ICAO is the UN body globally regulating civilian air travel. Article 22 of the convention states that each ICAO member, of which the DPRK is one, “agrees to adopt all practicable measures … to facilitate and expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories of the contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary delays”.
India
In May 2025 India and Pakistan fought a brief war following an attack on tourists by Islamist insurgents in the Indian-administered region of Jammu and Kashmir in northern South Asia. The 2026 report states that Indian forces deployed counterspace EW systems during Operation Sindoor. Sindoor was the codename for India’s operations against targets in Pakistan believed to be associated with Islamist elements blamed for the attack. Deployed Indian counterspace EW capabilities included GNSS PNT jamming/spoofing systems. No further details were shared in the 2026 report concerning India’s ongoing development of her Himshakti electronic attack system. Himshakti is believed to be capable of jamming SATCOM signals.
People’s Republic of China
The space EW capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remain shrouded in mystery. As the 2026 “China is likely to have significant EW counterspace capabilities against GNSS and satellite communications, although the exact nature is difficult to determine through open sources”, the report articulates. It continues that there is no public evidence that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has actively deployed counterspace electronic warfare means. The PLA has been strongly suspected of being responsible for deliberate GNSS PNT signal disruption around the port of Shanghai on the PRC’s East China Sea coast. In 2025 a paper was published by Chinese experts detailing how Starlink usage could be jammed across an area the size of the Republic of China (ROC). The paper concluded that up to 2,000 airborne jammers would be needed to this end. Whether or not such a feat would be possible remains unknown. Nonetheless, the paper may be indicative of PLA aspirations to hold Starlink at risk during any confrontation between the PRC and ROC.
Russia
Russian forces have long been accused of GNSS PNT jamming and spoofing in the Ukraine theatre of operations, the Baltic and in the eastern Mediterranean. In October 2025 the ICAO passed a resolution that Russian GNSS PNT jamming also infringed the 1944 Convention on Civil Aviation. Likewise, in November 2025, significant maritime Automatic Identification System (AIS) signal disruption in the Baltic was recorded. Details of the workings of AIS can be found here. Fake AIS messages were noted by Automatic Identification System tracking services in and around the Gulf of Finland. The source of this AIS interference remains unknown in the public domain.
Victoria Samson, chief director of the SWF’s space security and stability programme, and the report’s editor, alongside Kathleen Brett, the programme’s analyst, says several nations have become increasingly explicit about the negative impact of Russian GNSS PNT disruption. Regarding the dangers this interference poses for air travel, Ms. Samson told Armada that “we are really fortunate that this hasn’t resulted in fatalities in the civil aviation sector” but warned that “this luck can’t hold forever”.
United States
The United States continues to update the country’s Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) constellation. GPS is a GNSS constellation providing worldwide PNT coverage. As of early 2026, the SWF’s report stated that 24 GPS satellites are in orbit capable of providing military-grade M-Code PNT signals. M-Code will eventually supersede existing military-grade P(Y) code encrypted PNT signals transmitted by the GPS constellation. Nonetheless, the implementation of ground infrastructure elements necessary to fully exploit M-Code have suffered delays.
Assessment
Ms. Samson argues that several factors are motivating nations to research, develop and deploy counterspace electronic warfare capabilities: “(These capabilities) are extremely usable (because) they don’t cause permanent damage. They can be turned off and on easily. They are not seen as escalatory and they don’t damage the operating environment”. One cannot anticipate exactly how global counterspace electronic warfare will develop over the next twelve months, but global interest in EW as a space power capability will remain. Expect further developments in the countries discussed above, and possibly new entrants to the club of nations harnessing electromagnetic manoeuvre to underpin operations in the cosmos.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
