A new, timely, in-depth report gives a detailed assessments of the failures of the UK’s efforts to replace the Bowman combined tactical communications and command and control system.
In January Armada published an article entitled ‘Moving Forward’ which detailed new plans by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) to replace the Bowman tactical communications, and command and control system. Bowman is primarily used by UK land forces.
The MOD’s plans to replace Bowman have a tortured history. One of the most recent efforts, known as Evolve to Open (EVO) collapsed in 2024. EVO saw General Dynamics contracted to turn the current monolithic Bowman Combat Infrastructure Platform-5.6 (BCIP-5.6) architecture into an open, modular system. The logic behind EVO was to let Bowman easily accept hardware and software improvements over the rest of its life. EVO was part of the MOD’s Project Morpheus, the overarching initiative to replace UK land forces tactical communications. Morpheus in turn is part of the MOD’s wider Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems (LETACCIS) initiative.
In late January a new report was published by Intelligent Consulting. This company, its own words, “provides strategic cyber security, risk management and board-level advisory services to institutions operating at the heart of Europe’s political and defence landscape”. Written by the company’s director, Suzanne Button, the publication is entitled UK Defence Tactical Communications Modernisation: The Bowman Replacement Challenge. The report examines the status of efforts to overhaul UK land forces tactical communications, the legacy of these efforts and risks that may still be faced therein.
As Ms. Button notes, the Morpheus initiative commenced in 2016 and was supposed to conclude nine years later. To date, $1.1 billion has been spent but has yielded no deliverables. EVO’s termination alone cost $445 million. As Armada’s January report made clear, new efforts to replace Bowman could cost up to $12.8 billion. UK land forces should begin to receive new tactical communications from circa 2026 with deliveries concluding in 2034. As these new systems enter service, Bowman will be progressively retired. Nonetheless, retirement of the latter is not expected to commence before 2031.
Ms. Button identifies several risks inherent in extending Bowman’s service into the 2030s: There are questions regarding the resilience of Bowman’s anti-jam waveform to contemporary and future electronic attack vectors. Similar questions surround Bowman’s resistance to cyberattack. At the hardware level, Bowman’s electronics are obsolescent. Replacement parts are expensive and require substantial testing before use, which further increases costs. Moreover, the system’s software cannot support the data-intensive links that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) Multi-Domain Operations depends on.
Shortcomings
Where does the blame lie for EVO’s failure? Ms. Button argues that the MOD “set unrealistic requirements, demanding not merely an open architecture but the capability to integrate electronic warfare, cyber and Multi-Domain Integration concepts that were still nascent” when the EVO contract was awarded. As Armada has previously argued, moving Bowman from a closed to open architecture was akin to turning a 1990s cellphone into a smartphone.
Another issue was the EVO contract itself. Ms. Button states that the MOD contracted General Dynamics to deliver a laboratory-tested Bowman architecture, as opposed to a field-ready design. However, at the same time, the ministry “specified capabilities equivalent to full operational requirements”. Intelligent Consulting’s report claims the contract failed to produce the viable laboratory-tested Bowman architecture, let alone a field-ready version.
Risks ahead
Where does Morpheus go from here? As Armada’s January article stated, the MOD has launched a new tactical communications procurement known as the RM6393 Tactical Communications Framework. As opposed to adopting a ‘big bang’ approach to turn the Bowman architecture from a closed into an open configuration, the ministry is moving towards an “incremental, modular procurement strategy”. Ms. Button continues that the MOD’s desire to procure “fully integrated and supported systems” now suggests the acquisition of “multiple competing platforms with integration layers rather than a unified architecture”.
Replacing the entire Bowman architecture will not be easy. Intelligence Consulting’s report notes that over 50,000 transceivers must be acquired alongside their supporting infrastructure. Just taking the UK land forces vehicle fleet into account, new radios will demand new antennas, wiring, installation harnesses and software interfaces, to name just four elements. New tactical radios will need to work with a host of sovereign, NATO and allied waveforms. This latter point is essential to ensure intra- and inter-force communications. From a strategic perspective, the new radios must be ‘future proofed’ and flexible. While a revanchist Russia has put near-peer competition back on the strategic agenda, missions like counterinsurgency have not disappeared.
Ms. Button is concerned that RM6393 could see the procurement of fragmented solutions and capabilities that lack coherent integration. She warns that “evaluation and contract management will demand sophisticated government capability, precisely the weakness that undermined Morpheus’ oversight”. The existing Bowman architecture which is being evolved to BCIP 5.7 standard to allow it to remain in service until its new retirement date will have to be compatible with new RM6393 capabilities. However, “the technical interface specifications” to this end “remain undefined”. This risk is problematic as bidders will need to know how their wares can be backwards-compatible with the BCIP 5.7 architecture. Locking the specifications for RM63939 creates the danger that the development of avantgarde technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum-resistant encryption outstrip the MOD’s procured capabilities: “Freezing requirements in 2026 risks fielding obsolete systems by 2030”, warns the report.
That the MOD has launched a new effort to replace the UK’s ageing and troubled land tactical communications systems should be applauded. The ministry has no excuse not to learn lessons from the recent part, particularly given the publication of Intelligence Consulting’s report. Significant previous commentary has highlighted the failings of Bowman’s replacement, and suggested ways forward. Bowman’s age means that the MOD is fast running out of road to ensure UK land forces have the tactical communications they will need for a turbulent world. Executed correctly, Bowman’s replacement could be a textbook example of how to manage such a complex and expensive programme. Whether that becomes the case is entirely up to the MOD.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
