Armada has learnt that the People’s Republic of China supplied at least one DWL002 passive radar to the Venezuelan military. What role did this system play during Operation Absolute Resolve?
Venezuela’s DWL002 acquisition is thought to have occurred before Operation Absolute Resolve. This was the codename for the America military initiative to capture the erstwhile Venezuelan dictator President Nicolàs Maduro, and his wife Cilia Flores, on 3rd January. The operation was noteworthy for its success: Only a single helicopter from the United States Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment was damaged by Venezuelan ground-based air defences, according to reports. The helicopter was carrying commandoes to and from their objective, Mr. Maduro’s compound in downtown Caracas. Absolute Resolve included a comprehensive Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) component. The OCA effort resulted in the strike package of circa 150 US combat aircraft supporting the operation suffering no losses.
DWL002 defined
Open-source information states that the is designed to detect, locate and identify (henceforth known as process) air and maritime surface targets via their Radio Frequency (RF) signals. The vehicle-mounted system consists of three containers, each of which has a receiving antenna. By using three antennas the DWL002 determines the origin of Signals of Interest (SOIs). This is done by triangulating the line-of-bearing of each signal from each receiving antenna. The DWL002 uses two techniques to process a SOI; time difference or arrival and angle of arrival. By placing at least one of the receiving antennas on a higher point compared to the others, the DWL002 can determine a target’s angle of elevation. Alongside the three receiving antenna containers, the DWL002 has a master station from where the system is controlled. These constituent elements are networked using microwave radio links. These links use X-band (eight gigah,ertz/GHz to ten gigahertz) and Ku-band (twelve gigahertz to 18GHz) frequencies.
Alongside these techniques the DWL002 can detect disturbances to residual civilian television and radio broadcasting signals caused by their reflections from airborne targets. The system is equipped with three Yagi antennas collocated on each receiving mast for this purpose. The exploitation of residual RF radiation is intended to aid the detection of airborne targets using Emission Control (EMCON) techniques. Open sources continue that targets with a Radar Cross Section (RCS) of circa 0.01 square metres (-20 decibels-per-milliwatt/dBm) can be detected with using the Yagi antennas. Sources continue that RF signals from combat aircraft can be detected at ranges of circa 216 nautical miles/nm (400 kilometres/km).
SOIs captured and processed by the DWL002 include those from airborne surveillance and fire control radars, naval surveillance radars, identification friend or foe transponders, and airborne/maritime radio communications and navigation systems. Sources continue that the DWL002 can process emissions across wavebands of 100 megahertz to 18GHz. This waveband encompasses most radar and radio communications signals emitted by combat aircraft and warships.
The DWL002 and Venezuelan air defence
Several questions surround the DWL002 and its use, or otherwise, as part of Venezuela’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) and accompanying Ground-Based Air Defences (GBAD) on 3rd January. Firstly, was the system activated? As a passive system, the DWL002 would be attractive to deploy as it would not make any RF emissions that US Electronic Support Measures (ESMs) could process. Even its X-band and Ku-band communications signals would be difficult to detect at range: Their highly directional nature would make them hard to detect unless an ESM’s receiving antenna was directly pointing at them.
Nonetheless, the deployment of the system, with its three masts, supporting vehicles and containers could be relatively easy to identify from reconnaissance imagery unless heavily camouflaged. It is entirely possible that Venezuela’s DWL002 systems were not deployed prior to Operation Absolute Resolve. As tensions with the United States increased in the latter half of 2025, did the Venezuelan military decide to keep the passive radars out of the field? Keeping the DWL002s in the barracks may have avoided them being targeted by US assets.
It remains unknown how many DWL002s Venezuela acquired, when these were delivered or which of Venezuela’s armed forces operates them. Armada understands that the country’s air defences are the responsibility of the Ejército Bolivariano (Bolivian Army of Venezuela) and Aviación Militar Bolivariana (Bolivian Military Aviation of Venezuela). The army is the custodian of the country’s long-range/high-altitude and medium-range/medium-altitude surface-to-air missile batteries. The country’s militia and national guard are responsible for short-range air defence. The air force performs the command and control of the country’s CODAI (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral/Integrated Airspace Defence Command). CODAI is the national IADS and integrates the country’s GBAD assets and fighters. It is assumed that the DWL002 is commanded by the Venezuelan army.
The DWL002’s manufacturer advertises that the system can detect, locate and identify aircraft with low RCSs. The US Air Force’s Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor combat aircraft which participated in Operation Absolute Resolve has a reported RCS of between 0.0002 and 0.0005 square metres (-37dBm and -33dBm). The RCS of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning series combat aircraft, another participant, is reportedly 0.0015 square metres (-28.2dBm). Perhaps these RCSs were just too small for the DWL002 to adequately process?
Assuming that the DWL002 was active on the night in question, did US EMCON discipline simply deprive the DWL002 of any RF emissions to exploit? No doubt rigid EMCON discipline was exercised by both the participating American aircraft and ships. Was the DWL002 was able to detect some US assets that had been lackadaisical regarding EMCON? Even so, what if this information was shared but never reached a CODAI command and reporting centre? Although details remain sparse it seems likely that significant jamming efforts may have been performed by US air defence suppression assets like the US Navy Boeing E/A-18G Growler aircraft participating in the operation. The Growlers could have brought their capabilities to bear to significantly degrade radio networking knitting the IADS and GBAD assets. Cyberattacks against the IADS may have been successful by rendering its digital elements unserviceable or untrustworthy.
Assessment
Operation Absolute Resolve and the participation, or otherwise, of the DWL002 illustrates some important realities: First, a system like the DWL002 is arguably only effective as an air defence asset if it is networked into wider IADS and GBAD architectures. Second, the low RCSs of platforms like the F-22A and F-35 may be too small to be detected with any accuracy or precision by a system like the DWL002. Third IADS, and accompanying GBAD elements writ large, must be as survivable as possible. Survivability depends on kinetic, electronic and cyber resilience, redundancy and survivability. Ultimately, a system like the DWL002 is but one important part of an anti-access/area denial posture, but it is in no way a panacea.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
