Derek Grossman,
Professor, University of Southern California
One of the most serious China-Japan diplomatic crises in recent years unfolded in November after Chinese officials reacted strongly to remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who told lawmakers that a contingency over Taiwan stemming from a Chinese attack on Taiwan could, in the worst-case scenario, “constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Given such language would allow the deployment of troops to protect the Japanese homeland, China responded vociferously, with one Chinese diplomat appearing to threaten Takaichi’s life.[1] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing also accused Takaichi of interfering in its internal affairs and urged Tokyo “to refrain from going further down the wrong path.”[2]
Since then, Takaichi has sought a conciliatory path, seeking a return to the stable ties that she and Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged to maintain during their meeting in October on the sidelines of the APEC summit.[3] But Beijing refuses to let her off the hook. She has consistently called China “an important neighbor” and left the door open for dialogue.[4] But Beijing has responded by demanding a full retraction of Takaichi’s Taiwan comments.[5] “On key issues, Japan is still ‘squeezing toothpaste’ and ‘burying nails,’ attempting to obfuscate and muddle through,” a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson complained earlier last month,[6] essentially accusing her of making slow progress and appearing cooperative while secretly laying traps for diplomatic leverage later.
Beyond rhetoric, China has also taken concrete countermeasures. On December 14, it imposed sanctions against Shigeru Iwasaki, a former Chief of Staff of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces who serves as a consultant to Taiwan’s Cabinet, for his actions that Beijing says “seriously interfered” with and violated the “One China” principle.[7] Penalties include visa restrictions, a freeze on his Chinese properties and prohibition on transactions or cooperation with Chinese individuals and organizations.
That announcement came on the heels of a Chinese fighter jet reportedly locking its radars on to Japanese planes off the southern coast of Okinawa.[8] Locking radar onto a target can be a preparatory step for firing weapons, so it is widely viewed as a dangerous and provocative move. Takaichi responded by describing the incident as “extremely regrettable,” adding that “Japan has strongly protested to the Chinese side, and we firmly requested measures to prevent recurrence.” [9] After the U.S. State Department condemned China’s behavior, Beijing warned that “Japan’s allies, in particular, should heighten their vigilance and not be manipulated by Japan.”[10]
China has also retaliated economically against Japan, taking steps that are by now part of a familiar Chinese playbook of commercial coercion. For example, Beijing issued a travel advisory cautioning its citizens against traveling to Japan.[11] It has also postponed the release of two Japanese movies in China, and reinstated a blanket ban on Japanese seafood that had been relaxed since 2023.[12] Some of this is reminiscent of Beijing’s use of targeted economic measures against South Korea following Seoul’s decision to deploy the U.S.-made THAAD missile defense system in 2017.[13]
In addition to pressuring Japan on the military and economic fronts, Beijing has also raised sensitive historical issues. On December 13, it held a memorial ceremony for the Nanjing Massacre of 1937, during which the Japanese Imperial Army slaughtered some 142,000 people, according to a post-war Allied estimate, though China claims 300,000 people were killed.[14] The commemorative event was relatively low-key and Xi did not attend, but the Chinese military’s Eastern Command nonetheless posted a picture on social media showing a large bloody sword chopping off the head of a skeleton wearing a Japanese army cap. The caption stated, “For nearly 1,000 years, the eastern dwarves have brought calamity; the sea of blood and deep hatred are still before our very eyes.”
To top it all off, China also appears to be reversing course on decades of “panda diplomacy” to further demoralize Japan. Two Chinese pandas, Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei, are due to be returned this month, with no replacements planned.[15] That would leave Tokyo panda-less for the first time in over half a century.
Looking ahead, nearly all signs point to the crisis worsening further in the near term. This is because China appears determined to use Takaichi’s comments not only as a way to test Japan’s resolve, but also that of Washington’s under President Donald Trump. Takaichi is certainly dialing back her rhetoric, likely influenced by Trump’s suggestion that she do so as he seeks to avoid anything that could disrupt his recent trade truce with China.[16] But Trump’s admonition to Takaichi may have only emboldened Beijing, suggesting its years of efforts to drive a wedge between the U.S.-Japan security alliance are finally bearing fruit.
Takaichi, however, is set to visit the White House this spring and their relationship is still evolving.[17] Thus far, it’s clear that she and Trump have good personal chemistry and they could certainly reaffirm their alliance at the upcoming summit, especially before Trump visits Beijing in April. Moreover, Japan itself remains unbowed: Just a few days after Takaichi’s comments, for example, Tokyo accelerated preparations to deploy missile defenses to Yonaguni Island, approximately 70 miles northeast of Taiwan, to maintain defense of Japan’s southwest Nansei island region. Beijing has called the decision “extremely dangerous,” and has been critical of what analysts have described as Tokyo’s emerging “missile archipelago” throughout its southwestern Ryukyu Island Chain that could be used against China in a Taiwan scenario.[18]
Indeed, Beijing’s state-tabloid, Global Times, recently questioned Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Island Chain, to include both Yonaguni and Okinawa, and hinted that their political status is not immutable.[19] This was followed by China’s foreign ministry lodging a formal complaint over a visit to Taiwan by Japanese lawmakers from Takaichi’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[20]
Overall, neither side appears ready to back down. But Beijing would be unwise to dismiss Takaichi’s conciliatory turn. If it continues to use coercion and intimidation, it will only accelerate the very outcome it seeks to avoid: a more resolute Japan, a tighter U.S.–Japan alliance, and broader international sympathy for Tokyo’s position. Restraint, not pressure, is China’s off-ramp—if it chooses to take it.
Author
Derek Grossman is Professor of the Practice of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California. Professor Grossman is also Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In addition to his academic research, Grossman runs Indo-Pacific Solutions LLC, an independent consulting firm that provides cutting-edge analysis on the region.
Professor Grossman previously served as Senior Defense Analyst at RAND and Professor of Policy Analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. Before RAND, he served over a decade in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. Professor Grossman wrote an award-winning paper for the IC’s “Galileo Competition,” which solicits innovative ideas to optimize IC enterprise management practices. Prior to DIA, Professor Grossman served at the National Security Agency (NSA). He also worked at the CIA on the President’s Daily Brief staff.
Professor Grossman holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. national security policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in political science and Asian studies.
Notes:
[1] John Geddie, Tim Kelly and Mariko Katsumura, “Why Japan PM’s Taiwan remarks escalated tensions with China”. Reuters, November 20, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/why-did-japan-pms-taiwan-remarks-cause-such-stir-2025-11-11/.
[2] Xinhua, “China firmly opposes Japanese PM’s erroneous remarks on Taiwan: foreign ministry”. People’s Daily Online, November 11, 2025, https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1111/c90000-20388984.html.
[3] Reuters, “Japan’s Takaichi and China’s Xi agree to pursue stable ties”, October 31, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japans-takaichi-tells-chinas-xi-she-wants-constructive-stable-ties-2025-10-31/.
[4] Kyodo News, “Japan to seek constructive, stable ties with China: PM Takaichi”, December 17, 2025, https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/67000.
[5] Reuters, “China reiterates demand that Japanese PM retract Taiwan remarks”, December 16, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-reiterates-demand-that-japanese-pm-retract-taiwan-remarks-2025-12-16/.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Reuters, “China launches countermeasures against former Japan defence official”, December 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-launches-countermeasures-against-former-japan-defence-official-2025-12-15/.
[8] Shaimaa Khalil and Joel Guinto, “Japan protests after Chinese fighter jets lock radar on Japanese planes”. BBC News, December 8, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yqe197ypno.
[9] Ibid.
[10] ABC, “US backs Japan in dispute with China over radar incident as tensions escalate”, December 10, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-11/us-backs-japan-in-dispute-with-china-over-radar-incident/106128020.
[11] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Japan, “提醒中国公民近期避免前往日本” [Advising Chinese citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan in the near term], November 14, 2025, https://jp.china-embassy.gov.cn/zytz_0/202511/t20251114_11753712.htm.
[12] NHK News, “China postpones releases of 2 Japanese movies amid Taiwan remarks row”, November 18, 2025, ; Asahi Shimbun, “China reimposes ban on Japanese seafood amid ‘Taiwan’ row”, November 19, 2025, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16168020.
[13] Joel Atkinson, “South Korea’s THAAD pain shows what Takaichi can expect from China”. Nikkei Asia, December 2, 2025, https://asia.nikkei.com/opinion/south-korea-s-thaad-pain-shows-what-takaichi-can-expect-from-china.
[14] Al Jazeera, “China holds low-key Nanjing Massacre memorial without Xi amid Japan row”, December 13, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/13/china-holds-low-key-nanjing-massacre-memorial-without-xi-amid-japan-row.
[15] Financial Times, “Japan bids farewell to pandas as row with China deepens”, December 17, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/87be797e-da8a-4241-b077-595a029efba2.
[16] Lingling Wei et al., “Trump, After Call With China’s Xi, Told Tokyo to Lower the Volume on Taiwan”. Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-after-call-with-chinas-xi-told-japan-to-lower-the-volume-on-taiwan-3af795d6.
[17] Bloomberg, “Japan’s Takaichi Speeks to Trump, Plans to Visit in Spring”, January 2, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-02/japan-s-takaichi-says-she-ll-visit-trump-this-spring-after-call.
[18] Alastair Gale, “Japan builds up ‘missile archipelago’ near Taiwan to counter China”, December 13, 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/12/13/japan/japan-missile-archipelago/.
[19] Liang Rui et al., “What insights can today’s Ryukyu studies in China offer into historical memory and contemporary interpretations?”. Global Times, December 3, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1349674.shtml.
[20] Reuters, “China complains about Japanese official visiting Taiwan as Taipei pushed for cooperation”, December 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-lodges-complaint-about-japan-official-visiting-taiwan-2025-12-22/.
