Driving Toward Distributed Maritime Operations: Getting the Navy Out of Its VLS Hole

By Peter Kouretsos

The Department of War is addressing its critical shortfall in precision munitions, but it also needs more platforms capable of using them. This is especially true for the U.S. Navy. As the number of missile-equipped vessels shrinks, the Navy risks sailing into a dangerous trough, just as operational demands in the Indo-Pacific grow. To prepare for a more dangerous world and continue on its course of distributed maritime operations, the Navy could take steps to grow and make better use of its missile shooters.

The Navy faces at least three challenges for its missile shooters. First, in a high intensity fight, current vertical launch system (VLS) capacity may be insufficient to sustain operations, as ships risk rapid magazine depletion and could face challenges reloading in contested waters. Second, the defense industrial base struggles to keep missile production at pace with requirements. Third, much of the Navy’s missile capacity is concentrated in its cruiser and destroyer fleet; while these ships carry significant firepower for high-intensity operations, their loss—or even temporary withdrawal—would greatly reduce the fleet’s strike capacity. Each of these problems is interconnected, and addressing them all will require serious attention and investment. This article focuses on the first challenge—the number and distribution of VLS cells—and specifically what can be done with surface ships in the near term. While imperfect, the surface navy remains the workhorse of the fleet, and enhancing its strike and defensive capacity is an immediate way for the Navy to buy back combat power in this decade.

The Decline in Surface and Undersea VLS Capacity

One of the clearest indicators of naval firepower is the number of VLS cells across the fleet. These cells house everything from Tomahawks to Standard Missiles, and are an important part of the Navy’s offensive and defensive operations. But the Navy’s VLS capacity has been shrinking. As of early 2025, the Navy’s approximately 9,000 VLS are concentrated primarily in Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and submarines (primarily Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and Ohio-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs)), but the imminent retirement of cruisers and SSGNs represents a continued drop in total launchers, one that new construction alone will not significantly offset anytime soon. By the 2027-2028 time frame, the Navy will have fewer launchers at sea than it did in 2020—despite more demanding operational requirements.

This decline is especially troubling given the so-called “Davidson Window,” deadline by which the People’s Republic of China’s President Xi Jinping charged the People’s Liberation Army to be prepared for invading and capturing Taiwan. In any Indo-Pacific crisis, the Navy’s surface ships and submarines would be among the first U.S. forces to respond. Yet only a fraction of overall VLS capacity is forward-deployed west of the International Date Line. U.S. Seventh Fleet controls roughly 10–14 destroyers and cruisers and 8–12 submarines at any given time—facing a regional adversary operating close to home with shorter supply lines and faster reinforcement timelines.

The second problem is that deliveries of new destroyers and Virginia-class Block V submarines will eventually replenish lost capacity, but under today’s schedules, those platforms will not make a meaningful impact on missile inventories until well into the 2030s. Much has been written on the state of the submarine industrial base and efforts to improve its maintenance and production backlogs, but any further delays in Virginia Block V and future variant deliveries could extend the strike gap (see Figure 3). In the meantime, the Navy has demonstrated concepts for at-sea reloading of VLS cells, but these methods remain cumbersome and limited by weather, sea state, and operational risk. At-sea reloads will require ships to operate in relatively calm waters—often away from the fight—slowing the fleet’s ability to sustain fires in a peer conflict.

The Math of Winchester

A rough estimate of the U.S. Seventh Fleet figures discussed earlier suggests there could be about 1,600 VLS cells in the western Pacific at any given time. Assuming half of the surface capacity is reserved for defensive use and all undersea capacity is assumed to be offensive, only about 950 cells are available for offensive strike.³ That might sound like a lot, but it is not much of a margin. Most targets—especially more heavily defended ones—require multiple missiles to ensure an adequate probability of arrival and probability of kill, even in a precision world. A few salvos could leave the fleet “Winchester”—out of weapons and forced to withdraw.⁴ A shot doctrine of “shoot, look, shoot” or “shoot, shoot, look, shoot” while intended to conserve inventory, could quickly deplete a ship’s VLS magazine. That is not an abstract risk: in a contested environment, inability to sustain offensive pressure would push U.S. naval forces off the front line. The credibility of conventional deterrence depends not just on showing up, but on staying in the fight.

Momentum Before 2030

Faced with the dilemma of losing so much VLS capacity above and below the surface during a high-profile threat window, the Navy appears to be taking steps to address this looming gap. It announced plans to extend the service life of three Ticonderoga-class cruisers and twelve Flight I Arleigh Burke-class destroyers into the 2030s. If the Navy follows this plan, these delayed retirements—combined with new ship deliveries—could help VLS inventories reach pre-2020 levels by the end of the decade (see Figure 4). When these and other ships retire in the mid to late 2030s, Flight III Arleigh Burke-class and other vessel deliveries should help prevent significant declines in VLS capacity. Given the current state of the submarine industrial base, solutions for preserving and adding VLS capacity in the surface fleet appear more promising and achievable.

The Navy is also taking steps to up-gun other ships. In October 2019, the first Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) received two 4-cell canisters containing the Naval Strike Missile, which now reportedly has a range of greater than 300 km. By FY 2023 these were installed on eight ships, and there are plans to outfit the whole class of fifteen by FY 2026. Similar plans have been announced for ten Freedom-class LCSs. While these platforms do not match the punch of cruisers or destroyers, every additional shooter adds complexity for adversaries and depth to U.S. strike options. A more flexible launcher option to allow these vessels to carry other payloads for longer range, multi-mission strike and self-defense capability would go a long way to building out the Navy’s distributed maritime operations concept and complicating adversary plans.

A more ambitious and promising approach lies in containerized launchers. For example, the Navy recently tested and installed a MK 70 payload delivery system (PDS) on an LCS, and plans to install them on additional hulls, including uncrewed surface vessels. Based on the Army’s mid-range capability Typhon launcher, each 40 foot container can carry four Tomahawk- or Standard Missile-sized VLS weapons. While this might not amount to much at an individual level, launchers like the MK 70, Adaptable Deck Launcher (ADL), and other containerized launchers can be installed on most ships, including DDGs, LCS, and even amphibious ships and auxiliaries, without extensive modification. If widely deployed—three MK 70 per LCS, two MK 70 per amphib, six ADL per destroyer—containerized systems could add over 1,000 missile launch cells to the fleet by 2028 (see Figure 5).

These systems bring additional operational flexibility. Containerized launchers could be loaded onto vessels as needed based on the mission, allowing the Navy to quickly surge strike capacity in response to a crisis. Ships that might otherwise play only a supporting role in wartime—such as fast transports, amphibious command ships, or Military Sealift Command vessels—could carry launchers and operate as arsenal ships in lower-threat environments. This approach broadens the base of missile shooters without requiring new hull designs or major redesigns.

Simpler Reloads, Smarter Fires

Containerized launchers also offer a more flexible approach to reloading at sea. Unlike traditional VLS, which require specialized ships and calm seas for replenishment, containerized systems could be swapped out more quickly using cranes and be delivered preloaded. This would allow faster turnaround in safer waters and could enable ships to remain forward and armed for longer durations. The Navy could also continue exploring options for reloading from expeditionary sites, further increasing operational tempo.

Still, containerized launchers are not a panacea. They compete with other mission priorities for deck space—particularly on LCSs, amphibs, and logistics vessels with helicopter pads and mission bays – valuable real estate for resupply; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and air-launched effects. Some experimentation with different configurations might be necessary to strike the right balance. As a first step, placing one or two MK 70s on these ships would allow the Navy to evaluate operational tradeoffs and solicit feedback from crews. Meanwhile, destroyers could host several ADLs without compromising existing sensors, radars, or communications systems.

Even as the Navy experiments with reloading VLS at sea, it should rethink the future of its missile architecture. That could include considering and evaluating options for new ships with more flexible launcher form factors, developing new and more flexible VLS weapons, investing in logistics to reload under fire, and ensuring that forward forces can stay lethal for longer. Containerized launchers will not replace the traditional fleet, but they could buy valuable time for these solutions to materialize while adding redundancy when it matters most.

The U.S. Navy faces a period in which its missile-firing capacity is declining as strategic threats are rising. Distributing long-range fires across existing additional classes of ships with the help of containerized launchers offers a solution to fill the VLS gap, provide reload flexibility, and expand the number of shooters at sea. While some vessels might not possess the same organic communications, radars, and command and control capabilities as destroyers and cruisers, Navy efforts to improve the fleet’s connectivity and battle network could eventually mean these missiles can be used with the help of other ships in the theater. In distributing lethality this way, the Navy could dig itself out of its VLS hole faster, and achieve the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration.⁵

Peter Kouretsos is a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Young Leader with Pacific Forum, and a member of the Military Writers Guild. The article reflects the author’s personal views and not those of IDA, the US Navy, the Department of War, or any affiliated institution.

Endnotes

[1] Note: Total Missile Cells includes MK 41 and MK 57 VLS cells aboard surface ships, VLS tubes in Los Angeles- and Virginia-Class attack submarines, and Tomahawk cruise missile capacity of Multiple All-up Round Canisters, Virginia Payload Tubes, and Virginia Payload Modules employed on Ohio-class guided missile submarines, and Block III, IV, and V Virginia Class attack submarines, respectively.

[2] Note: Submarine Missile Cell figures do not include torpedo tube-launched weapons capacity.

[3] Assumes approximately 14 Flight IIA/III DDGs with a loadout split between defensive interceptors and offensive missiles, and 12 submarines (11 SSNs and 1 SSGN) with Tomahawk missiles.

[4] A notional target set might include 500 targets: the PLA Navy’s estimated battle force of 370 naval platforms, and 130 other targets such as air defenses, missile sites, aircraft hangars, and other operationally relevant surface infrastructure.

[5] Author note: The data and projections analyzed in this article were collected and compiled before the recent announcement regarding changes to the U.S. Navy’s frigate program – specifically the cancellation of the Constellation-class (FFG-62) frigates and subsequent development of the Navy’s new FF(X) frigate concept, which reportedly will not include an integrated VLS array in its initial configuration.

Featured image: USS Savannah (LCS 28) conducts a live-fire demonstration in the Eastern Pacific Ocean utilizing a containerized launching system that fired an SM-6 missile from the ship at a designated target. US Navy photo.