New research by EW Analytics LLC reveals some serious deficiencies in the performance of Russia’s IL222M Avtobaza-M SIGINT system an upgrade programme is trying to remedy.
In May 2024, Armada published an article examining Russia’s IL222M Avtobaza-M Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection platform, and its use by the Islamic Republic of Iran military. Alongside Iran, the IL222M is used by the Russian and Armenian armed forces. Regular visitors to the Armada website, and readers of our monthly Electronic Warfare Newsletter, will be familiar with our regular collaborations with EW Analytics LLC. EW Analytics LLC recently shared new research the company is publishing pertaining to the IL222M. It has revealed that Russian Avtobaza-Ms may be undergoing an upgrade programme to improve their capabilities.
Avtobaza’s capabilities
As noted above, the IL222M collects SIGINT, specifically in support of Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD). It detects, locates and identifies (henceforth referred to as processes) air threats via their electromagnetic emissions. Russian military documents seen by Armada say the IL222M processes emissions on a 200 megahertz/MHz to 18 gigahertz/GHz waveband. Avtobaza-M will process signals from Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders equipping aircraft. These transponders usually squawk across wavebands of one gigahertz/GHz to 1.21GHz. Aircraft Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) emissions from 962MHz to 1.213MHz can be processed by Avtobaza-M. Other key targets include emissions from Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.
Armada understands from official Russian language documents that the Avtobaza-M processes signals with a minimum strength of -88 decibels-per-milliwatt. Emission direction-finding is determined with between 0.4- and one-degree of accuracy. The documents continue that targets can be detected at ranges of up to 108 nautical miles (200 kilometres). Avtobaza-M shares data on target azimuth and elevation angle, radar type (pulse-Doppler and/or continuous wave) and emission waveform. Up to 60 targets can be simultaneously processed. Target detection is done using a rotating antenna making either six or twelve revolutions-per-minute. The IL222M consumes twelve kilowatts of electricity.
The system’s architecture includes one processing station, and four detection and direction-finding stations. The entire system is deployed on two vehicles and networked using a two-way fibre optic link carrying data at a rate of 1.2 kilobits-per-second. Target information (target angle, azimuth and elevation) is displayed on the operator’s console. Other parameters like signal carrier frequency and pulse duration are also displayed. Avtobaza-M’s human-machine interface is highly customisable by the operator. For example, taboo frequencies can be set along with specific search sectors and/or off-limits areas.
Air targets can be processed via their emissions providing bearing information relative to the system’s location. Once this information is determined, it can be shared with GBAD assets to alert the latter on a target’s possible ingress vectors. Likewise, this data can be shared with fighter controllers to direct combat aircraft to perform interceptions.
SOI’s source
EW Analytics LLC has examined patent documents filed with the Russian government’s Federal Intellectual Property Service. The company’s analysis noted that several patent applications had been lodged with the intellectual property service in 2015, 2016 and 2025. These patent applications either explicitly pertained to the Avtobaza-M or pertained to a system with almost identical capabilities.
The most recent patent application stressed that the IL222M in its current form is unable to accurately geolocate the origin of Signals of Interest (SOIs). Specifically, the pre-upgraded system cannot use Direction Finding (DF) techniques like Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) to determine a SOI’s point of origin. This is because prior to the recent upgrade, the Avtobaza-M did not have access to precision timing data provided by an atomic clock which is needed to perform TDOA processing, and which can be calibrated by a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).
Until now, the lack of an accurate time source will have severely impeded the ability of the IL222M to support the defensive counter-air battle. It is one thing knowing that SOIs are being transmitted by hostile aircraft in range of the system. However, this information is of limited use to GBAD elements if the location of the source of these emissions cannot be determined.
EW Analytics LLC’s analysis shows that the Russian military is aware of this shortcoming and that it is being addressed. Given that Russia has domestic industrial expertise in producing atomic clocks and GNSS receivers such subsystems may not be difficult to obtain. That said, Russia remains under international sanctions because of her ongoing war against Ukraine. These sanctions could impinge the country’s ability to source components for timing systems that cannot be obtained domestically. What is interesting about the IL222M upgrade is that it highlights a gap between the advertised capabilities of a Russian EW system and current performance realities. One wonders if similar discrepancies exist in other Russian electronic warfare platforms?
by Dr. Thomas Withington
