In late December 2025, forces backed by the United Arab Emirates swept across six governorates in southern Yemen and seized oil-rich provinces along Saudi Arabia’s border. Within days, Saudi airstrikes and Saudi-backed troops erased their gains. The Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council’s territory in Yemen was reduced to practically nothing. It then quietly declared its dissolution.
This drama marked the first direct military confrontation between forces backed by the two Gulf states whose cooperation has shaped the regional security architecture for over a decade. It signifies not merely a tactical disagreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on an isolated issue, but an unfolding strategic divergence with possible far-reaching consequences. An understanding of this divergence is imperative for U.S. and European policymakers because the Gulf remains vital to global energy markets, maritime corridors, and multilateral security frameworks.
De-Escalatory Developmentalism Versus Pre-emptive Activism
At its core, the Saudi-Emirati divergence reflects opposing views on regional stability, specifically whether the greater risk lies in intervention or restraint. Saudi “de-escalatory developmentalism” treats state collapse as the primary danger, emphasizing conflict reduction and border insulation to protect domestic transformation. By contrast, Emirati “pre-emptive activism” views the greater risk as allowing fragile arrangements to deteriorate unchecked, prioritizing external intervention to reshape a brittle order.
Saudi’s approach reflects a “de-escalation paradigm and homeland” logic. As a relatively large continental state with considerable absorptive capacity, the Kingdom views the region as basically manageable, preferring de-escalation where problems arise, and insulating itself from cross-border spillover. Riyadh is not looking to transform the region — it is looking to transform itself through ambitous strategic plans like “Saudi Vision 2030.” Riyadh avoids external interventions that could drain resources from domestic priorities, or trigger regional knock-on effects.
Underlying this caution is a Saudi conviction: “Imperfect states are not the problem — the problem is state collapse.” A weak government can be reformed, but a failed state becomes a vacuum for militias and extremists, creating cascading consequences like refugees and terrorism. Saudi Arabia’s objective is therefore to protect the legitimacy of existing states (even weak ones) and preserve internationally recognized borders as the least-bad foundation for regional order. This logic manifested in Riyadh’s evolving approach to Yemen, ultimately shifting toward border security and containing Houthi influence while simultaneously refocusing on domestic development.
Conversely, the Emirati understanding of the region operates from a logic of pre-emptive activism — viewing the regional order not as simply imperfect, but as a brittle arrangement that could deteriorate if left unaddressed. From this perspective, Iran and its regional allies represent actively corrosive forces undermining an already fragile situation. Whereas a more powerful state like Saudi Arabia could probably tolerate a long-term, less-than-ideal regional situation, the United Arab Emirates might not be so fortunate.
Abu Dhabi doesn’t see this as a competition with Riyadh, but as maintaining a degree of “strategic autonomy” from its larger neighbor. Abu Dhabi appears to assess that it has the agility to move creatively, focusing on developing global port systems, pursuing the Abraham Accords, and backing the Southern Transitional Council.
Riyadh argues, however, that at times the Emirati approach empowers secessionist militias that develop independent revenue streams and undermine host state authority from within, with the fear that Saudi Arabia may bear immediate consequences when instability arises. This was Riyadh’s view on Yemen.
The fundamental disagreement between the two countries is about the nature of the regional order itself and where the greater risks lie: in adventurous activism or complacent de-escalation. More regional states seem to favor Riyadh’s preference for conflict containment, including Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt. By contrast, the pre-emptive intervention camp is smaller, comprising the United Arab Emirates and, to a certain extent, Israel.
This imbalance — between the breadth of Saudi-style caution and the depth of Emirati capacity for intervention — helps explain why the Saudi-Emirati divergence has become crucial in contemporary Gulf politics. It also underscores the need for both capitals to be clear about the limits of their respective risk tolerance to prevent miscalculation and destabilizing outcomes.
Sources of Saudi-Emirati Tension in Yemen
These different approaches not only clash — they can have real-world consequences, especially when there is not only a lack of coordination between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but a lack of understanding. The two countries’ respective approaches to Yemen are a good case in point.
From the Emirati perspective, the Southern Transitional Council represented a vehicle for reshaping governance in southern Yemen, limiting the influence of Islamist-linked factions —particularly the Saudi-backed Islah. Presumably, the aim was to create structures that could provide long-term stability in a territory that has historically been difficult to govern. Abu Dhabi’s regional outlook holds that allowing the status quo to persist would ultimately produce worse outcomes, including renewed chaos, expanded Islamist influence, or Houthi gains. Early intervention thus contributed to the Council’s decision to act in December 2025.
Riyadh had opted to de-escalate in Yemen with the Houthis, and that shift led many observers to mistakenly assume that Riyadh was increasingly reluctant to use military force in Yemen. Riyadh’s swift response against the Southern Transitional Council’s territorial seizure therefore came as a surprise to the Council and its allies. Yet, the Kingdom’s response was wholly consistent with its strategic framework. Riyadh viewed the separatist advance in southern Yemen — particularly the seizure of Hadramout and al-Mahra along Saudi Arabia’s border — as a direct threat to Saudi national security. Allowing the advance to proceed unchecked would have weakened the internationally recognized Yemeni government. It would also have given the Houthis space to exploit divisions between government forces and the Southern Transitional Council while diminishing Saudi influence in a theater Riyadh considers vital. Taken against that set of assumptions, Riyadh’s forceful response becomes more understandable, if debateable.
But there is an added dimension to this particular episode, as Riyadh is convinced that the Southern Transitional Council did not act on its own. Rather, Riyadh believes Abu Dhabi authorized the Council’s moves. Saudi Arabia interpreted this as the United Arab Emirates prioritizing the Southern Transitional Council over its relationship with Riyadh — in other words, an act of hostility. Moreover, the possibility of southern Yemen’s independence represents the kind of uncontrolled risk that Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy is designed to prevent.
As such, from Riyadh’s perspective, the Council’s advances did not simply prompt Riyadh’s decision to use military force in Yemen, but were an example of open Emirati challenge to what Riyadh perceives as its rightful leadership role in the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia now sees itself as stewarding a regional consensus on Yemen.
Ripples Across the Gulf
The growing Saudi-Emirati rift has significant implications for Gulf Cooperation Council political cohesion, particularly because it exposes disagreements over leadership, threat perceptions, and acceptable limits of unilateral action. From Riyadh’s perspective, security challenges exacerbated or enabled by a fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member represent a qualitatively different problem than external threats, especially when such tension diverts collective attention away from what Saudi Arabia continues to frame as a shared priority of containing Iran.
These concerns are inseparable from questions of regional leadership and legitimacy. Saudi Arabia’s position within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider Gulf has long rested on a (contested) understanding of Riyadh as “first among equals,” reinforced by both military and economic power and the symbolic authority of the Saudi king as khādim al-ḥaramayn (servant of the two holy places of Mecca and Medina). Under King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud — and with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman exercising decisive control — this leadership claim remains central to Saudi regional strategy. Thus, actions by smaller Council member states such as the United Arab Emirates that appear to bypass or challenge this authority are seen by Riyadh not merely as a policy disagreement, but a challenge to regional order.
This power struggle has played out beyond Yemen, notably in relation to Israel. Saudi officials have consistently insisted that normalization with Israel should be contingent on the establishment of a Palestinian state, in line with the 2003 Arab Peace Initiative launched under Saudi auspices. This position has hardened following widespread public outrage over Israel’s war in Gaza, including legal proceedings brought against Israel at the International Court of Justice on charges of genocide, which Riyadh supports. In this context, Riyadh is acutely sensitive to perceptions that a fellow Gulf state — one that has normalized relations with Israel and pursued an increasingly autonomous regional security posture — is undercutting Saudi diplomatic leadership on one of the most symbolically charged issues in Arab politics.
The Saudi-Emirati fallout has increasingly spilled into the information space. Disputes have been accompanied by sustained social media campaigns involving state-linked accounts and proxy outlets, which harden public narratives, narrow diplomatic room for maneuver, and raise the political cost of compromise. Rather than facilitating de-escalation, these dynamics entrench rivalry and obscure the underlying issue at stake: the absence of a shared understanding between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi about the limits of autonomy, leadership, and acceptable divergence within the regional security order.
These regional dynamics have broader ripple effects. External actors have long operated on the assumption that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would avoid open competition in the same theater, particularly where counter-terrorism cooperation, maritime security initiatives, and de-confliction mechanisms were involved. That assumption no longer appears reliable. Security cooperation initiatives that previously treated the Gulf Cooperation Council as a unified bloc will increasingly require issue-specific calibration and an explicit recognition that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may now pursue competing objectives within the same operational space.
Despite the disagreement, Saudi Arabia has not imposed diplomatic rupture, economic boycott, or border closures against the United Arab Emirates. Yet, what has shifted is the political cover Riyadh historically provided Abu Dhabi. Many Arab states view Gulf Cooperation Council members through the Council’s Saudi-centric lens. By permitting official and semi-official media to openly criticize Emirati policies, Riyadh has partially lifted the umbrella, prompting criticism from some underheard voices.
The effects of this shift are already visible beyond Yemen. In the Horn of Africa, where Gulf competition has long intersected with port access and maritime security, Somalia’s recent disavowal of agreements with the United Arab Emirates and its closer alignment with Riyadh reflects this altered landscape. Such moves are occurring along one of the world’s most critical shipping corridors, underscoring that intra-Gulf rivalry now carries broader implications for Red Sea and Indian Ocean security rather than remaining a narrow bilateral dispute.
Conclusion
The Saudi-Emirati tension reflects competing answers to two questions: How can regional stability be upheld, and what risks are acceptable in taking action versus inaction?
Saudi Arabia chooses consolidation, restraint, and threat insulation. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates prefers transformation and early intervention. Both approaches reflect calculations rooted in differing threat perceptions, domestic priorities, and strategic cultures. The events of late December 2025 and early January 2026 in Yemen have demonstrated how much can change, and how quickly, when these two regional powers operate in tension.
This competition is not confined to security policy. Trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives — long treated as technocratic or insulated from political rivalry — are increasingly exposed to Saudi-Emirati competition. For external partners, this complicates risk assessments in sectors once assumed to benefit from Gulf unity, reinforcing the need to evaluate political signaling and strategic rivalry alongside economic opportunity.
U.S. and European policymakers should acknowledge that Gulf politics are now characterized by competition between two different approaches in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, with the future of regional geopolitics being shaped by the interaction between Emirati pre-emptive activism and Saudi de-escalatory developmentalism. It is unclear which approach will prove more durable under sustained economic, security, and international pressures. Managing that reality — rather than assuming convergence — is now a central analytical and operational challenge for policymakers with sustained interests in Gulf security, energy markets, and regional stability.
H. A. Hellyer, Ph.D., has operated at the nexus of government policy and think tanks for the past 20 years, focusing on geopolitics and security in the wider Arab world and Middle East region, as well as Europe and Southeast Asia. He currently serves as senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Formerly deputy convenor of the U.K. government’s working group on tackling radicalization and extremism, Hellyer has held positions at the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, and the U.K. Foreign Office.
Image: Saudi Press Agency via Wikimedia Commons
