WASHINGTON—The House’s September 16 passage of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 is a bipartisan victory for Ukraine and, if signed and implemented, for the United States. The bill passed the Senate on August 7 and, barring procedural hurdles, should now head to President Donald J. Trump’s desk for signature. From there, it gets complicated: Will the administration use it as its sponsors intended, to pressure the Kremlin to end its war against Ukraine? In that case, it could provide muscle to the spotty US negotiating efforts to end the war and be a fitting tribute to the late senator whose name the legislation bears. Or will the fears of some of the bill’s opponents—that the administration will not implement it in good faith but either stall or subvert its intent—be realized?
The bill’s most powerful and controversial provision is Section 113, which would impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on countries that import large amounts of Russian crude oil or natural gas or are major facilitators of sanctions evasion. That list certainly includes China and India, but it may also include US allies such as Turkey and Japan, as well as European Union allies such as Slovakia and Hungary. Critics maintain that tariffs are a poor tool in general for putting pressure on Russia or third countries. They have a point, especially given the often ineffective, even clumsy way the administration has handled tariffs to date. Critics specifically argue that Section 113 gives the administration broad authority that it could abuse, for example by imposing tariffs on the entire EU because of oil and gas purchases by some member states.
These aren’t empty objections. Implementation will be tricky. But the act includes flexibility that could help it work. Section 113(b) allows tariff rates to be adjusted if a country reduces or ends its imports of Russian oil or gas. That would give the United States flexibility to work with countries that agree to reduce those purchases. EU decisions already require member states to eliminate purchases of Russian oil and gas by the end of 2027. The United States could make similar arrangements with importers of Russian oil and gas, even India and China, to lower their purchases over time—a “ramp down” process that the United States used in the past to reduce Chinese and Indian purchases of Iranian oil. Section 113(c) also limits the tariffs to the five largest importers of Russian oil and gas, so the list of targeted countries is not large in any case.
My last job in government was as sanctions coordinator at the Department of State. I helped design US sanctions against Russia after its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and I negotiated the measures with European and other governments. There are no guarantees against poor or even bad-faith actions by this or any administration. But if I were back in that job now, I could use Section 113 effectively to work with other governments to cut Russia’s income from oil and gas sales. This administration can do the same. My own concern is less that the administration will use the act to bash the EU, and more that it will simply issue waivers and not use the tough provisions much at all.
Congress has wisely chosen to accept the bill’s risks because, if implemented, it can push Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his war against Ukraine. The best course now would be for Trump to sign it, with fanfare and surrounded by a bipartisan group of its supporters, including Darlene Graham Nordone, Graham’s sister, who now holds his Senate seat in South Carolina. Again making clear that he is committed to ending the war, the president could announce that his administration will implement the bill quickly and forcefully.
Such a sign of US commitment would give heart to Ukrainians who are fighting a just war of national survival. It would show European allies, themselves subjected to Russian aggression in the form of drone attacks, assassinations, and arson, that the United States can show solidarity with its allies in the face of threats from an adversary. It might also send a message to the Kremlin to stop stalling on peace negotiations.
