Rewiring the South Caucasus – European Security & Defence

Europe has long viewed the South Caucasus through a narrow security lens: a region shaped by Russian influence, energy vulnerabilities,  and persistent instability driven by the “frozen conflicts” of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Today however, this region (Europe’s near neighbourhood), is quickly evolving into something more strategically important. Once seen as Europe’s periphery, the region is increasingly becoming a key geopolitical crossroads linking Europe to Central Asia, and beyond. 

At the centre of this transformation sits the so-called “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), an emerging transport and connectivity initiative that could reshape the regional balance of power and alter Europe’s strategic relationship with the South Caucasus.

While much of the recent international attention has focused on the military and hard security dimension, with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s decades-long conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the current geopolitical setting is more about infrastructure, transport and energy transit routes, corridors, and wider strategic influence. The South Caucasus has become part of a wider competition over how Europe connects to Asia in a hotly contested geopolitical environment. [Read the Viewpoint from Azerbaijan]

It is Russia’s war against Ukraine that has fast-tracked this change in dynamics. European governments and businesses have begun seeking alternatives to Russian transit routes, while instability around maritime chokepoints has increased interest in overland connectivity between Europe and Asia. The result is that the so-called “Middle Corridor” — which links Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye — has now moved from theory to a strategic priority.

And in this fast-evolving context, Armenia’s geographic position has acquired far greater importance.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has increasingly presented Armenia not as an isolated post-Soviet state trapped between hostile neighbours, but as a potential strategic connector between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. His government’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative is looking to reopen almost forgotten regional railways, highways, and trade routes, most of which have been closed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of conflict with Azerbaijan in the early 1990s.

Pashinyan recently argued that once Armenia’s borders with both Türkiye and Azerbaijan are reopened, the country’s geography effectively changes overnight. A state defined by blockade and isolation instead becomes a bridge between regions.

From Isolation to Connectivity

The TRIPP project was born in 2025 following negotiations surrounding the reopening of transport routes between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. Following Azerbaijan’s military victories in 2020 and 2023 over Armenia and separatist ethnic-Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku pushed for a direct transport corridor through Armenia’s southern Syunik province, bordering Iran.

Armenia however, immediately resisted any arrangement that would imply a loss of sovereignty or extraterritorial control. Instead, the compromise appears centred on reopening regional infrastructure under Armenian jurisdiction while integrating it into wider east-west connectivity projects stretching across Eurasia.

But the geo-strategic implications extend far beyond a single railway line.

TRIPP’s wider vision includes roads, logistics hubs, fibre-optic cables, energy interconnectors, energy pipelines, and critical infrastructure aiming to link Europe to Central Asia. For Washington, Brussels, Ankara, and increasingly Central Asian governments themselves, the South Caucasus is becoming part of a wider effort to diversify transport networks away from Russia and reduce dependency on vulnerable maritime routes.

Recent developments have only deepened this dynamic. In May 2026, Armenia and Iran moved towards finalising a strategic partnership covering transport, infrastructure, and wider economic co-operation, underlining Tehran’s determination not to become marginalised by the region’s evolving connectivity plans. For Iran, the South Caucasus is no longer simply a neighbouring region, but increasingly part of a wider geopolitical contest involving the United States, Israel, Türkiye, and emerging Eurasian transit routes. Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June 2026 are therefore carrying greater significance, far beyond regular domestic politics. They effectively represent a referendum on Armenia’s future geopolitical orientation.

The results from Armenia’s parliamentary elections on 7 June 2026 has reinforced this trajectory. Pashinyan’s victory has been interpreted as more than political success domestically; it has effectively endorsed the government’s aim to re-orient Armenia following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia’s failure to meet its obligations as Armenia’s primary security guarantor. Despite criticism from nationalist and pro-Russian opponents, voters ultimately backed a leadership advocating regional normalisation, economic connectivity, and a more diversified foreign policy.

For Moscow, the result represents another setback in a region long seen as part of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in the Caucasus. However, the election does not mark the end of Russian influence in Armenia, as Russia remains firmly embedded in Armenia’s economy and energy sectors, and also its security architecture, while the presence of Russian forces and border guards continues to provide Moscow with important levers of influence. Nevertheless, the political direction chosen by Armenian voters suggests that Russia’s ability to shape Armenia’s strategic choices is gradually diminishing.

The wider significance of the recent election result extends far beyond Armenia itself. The outcome will be welcomed in Brussels and Washington as a confirmation that Yerevan is committed to closer political and economic engagement with Western partners. It also boosts prospects for regional connectivity initiatives such as US-led TRIPP and the future of the Middle Corridor, both of which need a stable government in Yerevan willing to compromise with (and resist) neighbours. In this sense, the election was not simply a domestic contest, but a further indicator that the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus continues to evolve away from the Russian-centred order that dominated the region for much of the post-Soviet era.

Armenia’s Strategic Pivot

Although Pashinyan came to power in 2018, his government’s decisive shift towards the West only gathered pace after 2023, when Armenia’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and Moscow’s failure to uphold its security commitments prompted a reassessment of the country’s reliance on Russia. The collapse of the self-proclaimed Armenian administration Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and subsequent displacement (exodus) of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians (the entire population, bar a handful of 40 or so frail and elderly unable to leave: UN teams later in 2025 found about ten people still left in the territory) fundamentally reshaped Armenian public perceptions of Russia’s reliability as a security guarantor.

After 2023, Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus consequently weakened considerably. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 hostilities were essentially sidelined before eventually withdrawing, while Armenia has deepened political engagement in the meantime with the EU and the United States. First of all, Yerevan welcomed an EU monitoring mission (European Union Mission in Armenia – EUMA) along its border with Azerbaijan, enhanced cooperation with Brussels and European institutions, and cautiously sought closer ties with individual NATO members.

Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” doctrine perfectly reflects this broader strategic shift. This a concept that argues for Armenia abandoning historical revisionism and territorial ambitions in favour of securing sovereignty, economic development, and long-term stability through normalisation of relations in the region and a diversification of its foreign relations. However, the policy remains deeply controversial domestically.

Opposition figures have long accused Pashinyan of conceding too much to Azerbaijan and abandoning Armenian interests in Nagorno- Karabakh. A number of nationalist and pro-Russian political forces have positioned themselves against the Pashinyan government’s foreign policy agenda and its shift towards Europe.

Today, this political polarisation is increasingly shaping Armenia’s internal landscape. The significance of this shift was reinforced by US Secretary of State Rubio’s visit to Yerevan in late May 2026, one of the clearest signals yet of Washington’s growing strategic interest in Armenia and the wider South Caucasus. Rubio publicly backed Armenia’s sovereignty, regional connectivity ambitions, and efforts to diversify away from its dependence on Russia.

For Europe, however, Yerevan’s strategic reorientation offers a significant opportunity, since Brussels sees the South Caucasus as increasingly important not only for regional stability, but also for the bloc’s greater economic resilience.

Europe’s Expanding Interests

For the EU, the South Caucasus now intersects with multiple strategic priorities simultaneously. The region already plays an important role in Europe’s energy diversification strategy through the Southern Gas Corridor which transports Azerbaijani natural gas to European markets. At a time when Europe is seeking to reduce strategic dependencies exposed by the Ukraine war, wider connectivity has become a security issue.

And it is the Middle Corridor that can offer Europe this alternative east-west route, bypassing Russia entirely. While still extremely limited in capacity compared with maritime shipping or the pre-war northern transit routes through Russia, its geopolitical value has increased significantly since the full-scale war broke out in Ukraine in 2022.

The Corridor also aligns with European ambitions surrounding critical minerals, supply-chain resilience, and economic engagement with Central Asia. Kazakhstan for example, increasingly eager to diversify its export routes westwards, is showing growing interest in boosting transport links through the South Caucasus, including potential Armenian branches connected to Middle Corridor infrastructure.

At the same time, instability elsewhere in the region has further increased Armenia’s strategic relevance for Western partners. Georgia, long considered the West’s main regional partner and a central transit state linking the South Caucasus to the Black Sea, has in recent years faced growing accusations of democratic backsliding and authoritarian drift. Concerns in both Brussels and Washington that Tbilisi may gradually move away from its Euro-Atlantic orientation have complicated Western planning surrounding the Middle Corridor and regional connectivity.

As for EU member states, as expected, France has emerged as one of Armenia’s strongest European backers. The Armenian diaspora in France is one of the largest and most politically influential in Europe; estimates range between 400,000 and 700,000 people of Armenian origin, concentrated particularly in Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and the south of France. The bi-lateral relationship is also shaped by history, since France formally recognised the Armenian genocide in 2001, with support for Armenia cutting across much of France’s political spectrum. For his part, President Macron has openly criticised Russia’s abandonment of Armenia during the Nagorno- Karabakh conflicts, while championing France as a political supporter of Armenia’s sovereignty and regional integration efforts.

The 8th European Political Community (EPC) summit hosted in Yerevan in early May 2026 — the first ever hosted in the South Caucasus — reinforced the message that Europe now views the South Caucasus as strategically connected to the continent’s wider security environment. The EPC was immediately followed by the inaugural EU–Armenia Summit attended by EU leaders (von der Leyen, Costa), underlining Armenia’s political shift towards Europe.

Yet Europe’s ambition in this region also carries risks, not least because the EU’s economic interests in the region that are expanding faster than its geopolitical leverage. Brussels can always offer funds, investment, diplomatic engagement, and small monitoring missions with limited mandates, but in reality, the Union lacks any hard-power capability which ultimately shape security realities in a region such as the South Caucasus. This is after all, a very different setting to the Western Balkans.

Türkiye’s Expanding Influence

It is no surprise that Ankara has emerged as one of the main geopolitical beneficiaries of the region’s transformation. Türkiye has long supported any expansion of east-west transit routes through the region and clearly views the Middle Corridor as central to its ambition of becoming a major Eurasian logistics and energy hub. And the reopening of Armenian-Turkish borders would obviously provide Ankara with direct overland access further into Central Asia.

We should also recall that Türkiye’s military partnership with Azerbaijan has already transformed the regional balance of power. The success of Azerbaijani military operations in 2020 and 2023 demonstrated the effectiveness of Turkish military assistance, including through drones, training, and operational liaison. Since then, Ankara’s influence across the South Caucasus has grown steadily while Russia’s former dominance has diminished in turn.

For Europe, Ankara’s role in European connectivity projects has gradually become increasingly important, particularly regarding access to Central Asia and alternative trade routes. Yet, as has been the case for years, broader tensions between Türkiye and some parts of Europe have continued to complicate the relationship.

But it is geography that works in Ankara’s favour. Any meaningful east-west corridor linking Europe to Central Asia through the South Caucasus inevitably enhances Ankara’s strategic relevance, to both NATO and the European Union.

Watching On Closely – Russia and Iran

It is hardly surprising — neither Russia nor Iran welcomes the region’s new trajectory.

For Moscow, Armenia’s westward shift represents another example of eroding Russian influence within the post-Soviet space. And although the Kremlin remains heavily distracted by the war in Ukraine, it still maintains significant economic, political, and security leverage over Armenia, including energy supplies and infrastructure ownership. Moreover, Russian border guards from the FSB are still stationed along parts of Armenia’s frontiers (with Türkiye and Iran), and there is the continued presence of Russian armed forces at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri (operating under a long-term bilateral agreement extending to 2044). At the same time however, Moscow’s leverage is no longer what it once was. Russia’s credibility as Armenia’s primary security guarantor suffered heavily after failing to prevent Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent exodus of the territory’s ethnic Armenian population in 2023. The withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the region later symbolised the broader erosion of Moscow’s authority across the South Caucasus.

Senior Russian officials have already begun framing Armenia’s growing European engagement as “incompatible” with membership in Moscow-led regional organisations such as the Eurasian Economic Union. While Russia has thus far limited itself to political pressure and economic signalling, more coercive measures remain possible if Armenia accelerates its geopolitical shift westward. Energy price hikes, trade restrictions, and cyber pressure spring to mind when it comes to what Moscow has available should it pursue coercive measures.

Iran is also viewing developments with concern. Iranian officials are highly sensitive to geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus that run the risk of altering the regional balance, and which might deepen Israeli and US involvement.

This concern has only sharpened amid Tehran’s confrontation with Washington and Israel. Iranian policymakers fear that emerging east-west corridors through Armenia’s Syunik province could eventually reduce Iran’s own strategic importance as a transit state while simultaneously increasing Turkish, Israeli, and Western influence along Iran’s north-western frontier. Tehran has been particularly wary of any arrangement resembling the originally proposed “Zangezur Corridor”, which Iranian officials viewed as potentially undermining Iran’s direct access to Armenia and strengthening the Azerbaijan–Türkiye axis.

Iran’s concerns are also shaped by Azerbaijan’s close defence and intelligence relationship with Israel, particularly following Baku’s extensive use of Israeli military technology during the Nagorno- Karabakh conflicts. Against the backdrop of wider regional tensions and disputes surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, the South Caucasus increasingly risks becoming entangled within a much broader geopolitical confrontation extending well beyond the region itself.

Europe’s New Frontier?

Despite broad geopolitical enthusiasm surrounding TRIPP and the Middle Corridor, major structural weaknesses remain. Cargo volumes have risen sharply since 2022, but the route still handles only a fraction of the capacity previously moving through Russia’s Northern Corridor. Key infrastructure projects remain stalled, particularly Georgia’s long-delayed Anaklia deep-sea port, while fragmented customs systems, limited rail capacity, and bottlenecks across the Caspian Sea continue to constrain scalability. Increasing environmental concerns surrounding the gradual shrinking of the Caspian Sea add a further long-term uncertainty to the corridor’s viability.

A final Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty has not yet been fully ratified. Border disputes continue, infrastructure gaps remain, and domestic opposition inside Armenia could still complicate implementation of constitutional changes that are required under the evolving peace framework.

As argued above, the South Caucasus is increasingly becoming part of Europe’s wider strategic environment. Yet connectivity, energy infrastructure, digital routes, and trade corridors are now deeply linked with issues of security and geopolitical influence.

What emerges across this region is not simply a commercial transport project, but a broader contest over the future architecture of Eurasian connectivity in the post-Ukraine-war era. And increasingly, that contest intersects not only with Russia’s declining regional influence, but also with the wider confrontation between Iran and the West, instability in Georgia, and growing US efforts to reinforce alternative geopolitical and economic corridors linking Europe to Central Asia.

Whether TRIPP succeeds or not, the strategic direction is already clear: the geopolitical map between Europe and Asia is being redrawn, and the South Caucasus is moving much closer to the centre of it. But for now, the Middle Corridor represents a strategic alternative whose long-term viability remains uncertain.

Author: David Liddell

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