This article challenges the assumption that recent conflicts in Ukraine and Iran will necessarily accelerate global nuclear proliferation by strengthening the perception of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty and regime survival. It argues that Iran’s experience demonstrates the political, economic, reputational, and military costs of pursuing nuclear weapons, while both the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate the growing potential of drones as cheaper, faster, and less politically costly instruments for deterrence by punishment. By highlighting drones as a possible alternative to nuclear deterrence by punishment, the article suggests that the emerging security environment may not produce an era of nuclear plenty but rather open a path for states to seek deterrence without nuclear weapons.
The world worries about the spread of nuclear weapons not only, but especially in recent years. With the Iranian nuclear weapon program damaged but not fully destroyed, about nuclear saber rattling by Putin, or the fear of the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for NATO, debates about nuclear proliferation are on the rise. Last year in Poland, Prime Minister Donald Tusk hinted at the possibility of developing an own nuclear weapon program, while only recently Saudi Arabia and struck a deal with the United States that might allow the former to enrich Uranium on its own soil. This opinion piece makes the point that a nuclear plenty might not materialize because technological developments open the path for developing capabilities for sufficient conventional deterrence. With the rise of drone warfare policymakers across the globe might find more affordable ways of deterring military interventions without risking international reputation, sanctions or preemptive strikes to prevent a breakthrough. As unlikely as it might sound, both the war against Ukraine as well as the war against Iran serve as cases in point.
The bad news first. Most observers of the recent war against Iran draw a similar conclusion: the attacks by the United States were neither sufficient to end the Iranian nuclear weapon, nor did they break the will of the regime to continue the pursuit of its nuclear program. In addition, since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022, if not already with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, many politicians and scholars present the conflict as evidence for the effectiveness of deterrence. Lately, with the announcement of a U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal, there has been further fear about a Saudi nuclear weapon program and the risks of a new round of nuclear proliferation.
The Political and Economic Costs of Nuclear Weapons
So, does this mean, as some seem to think, that more countries than before the conflict will consider nuclear weapons the ultimate security guarantee, the protector of sovereignty and state survival? Are we at the beginning of an era of nuclear plenty? The answer is likely to be no. And the answer holds not despite these two events, but due to them. Both conflicts, in Ukraine and Iran, as counterintuitive as it might sound, present two reasons why the alleged inherent desirability of nuclear weapons is less convincing than ever.
The first reason lies in Iran’s nuclear weapon program and the consequences it faced for pursuing it, peaking in this year’s war. Since it became clear that the Iranian regime was striving for its own nuclear weapons, not only the United States but a majority of the world engaged in isolating the country and bringing down its regime with sanctions and military aggression. The regime struggled more than once for sheer survival, and the effort it had to make to survive economically and politically was immense. The costs that were imposed on the Iranian regime and its people were so high that one dares ask the question whether any state that witnessed these developments would be willing to endure a similar treatment. True, ultimately, the attempts most likely failed, and Iran will continue its nuclear journey. However, this might be more due to sunk costs and the notion to save face domestically by not backing down to pressure from the United States. But any other government in its right mind might think twice about going down the same path.
The Age of Drone Deterrence
The other lessons countries might draw against nuclear proliferation are drawn not only from Iran but also from the Russian war against Ukraine. In different ways and from arguably very different starting positions, both countries turned in a rather short time into a vanguard in drone warfare. Both countries not only use drones on the battlefield, be it in Eastern Ukraine or the Strait of Hormuz, but also in attacking the military and economic infrastructure of adversaries, as well as striking terror in the hearts of their citizens – with Ukraine’s adversary starting to copy this strategy as well. Ukrainian drones strike as deep in Russian territory as the Russian capital, even potentially causing enough fear for Putin to downgrade military and naval parades and a shortage in gasoline that, as some observers claim, even threatens his hold on power. Iran used drones not only against United States military bases in the region but also against Israel and Gulf allies of the United States, threatening not only their oil infrastructure but also their attempt at becoming a global hub for AI infrastructure and a tourism hotspot. And this does not even take the global economic costs into account, which were raised by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz via establishing a constant threat of drone attacks.
The lesson to be learned, from rogue states thinking about regime survival to European countries losing trust in the nuclear umbrella under a Trump-led United States, might as well be the following: Developing nuclear weapons is costly, slow, and reputationally and politically costly, and potentially inviting pre-emptive strikes. Drones are cheap, can be produced quickly and decentralized, as the example of Ukraine demonstrates. The country is likely too produce more than five million drones just in 2026 (claiming the potential of up to 20 million per year), with a single Sting interceptor drone costing merely $2,500 and a diversified and decentralized infrastructure prevented Russia from meaningfully degrade Ukraine`s capacity for drone production. Moreover, neither their production nor their use face similar reputational or military risks, not to mention the ethical costs of threatening nuclear mass slaughter on other countries as a form of protection. Furthermore, drones do not require the infrastructure a secure nuclear second-strike capability requires, e.g., costly silos or submarines that require access to deep seas are not available to every country.
Substituting Nuclear with Conventional Deterrence
The credible threat of striking with nuclear weapons is what Schelling termed effective deterrence by punishment. Nuclear weapons provide the possibility of forcing costs so high that they outweigh any potential benefit a military aggressor would hope for. As some scholars have already pointed out, there is no convincing reason to assume this could be achieved only via nuclear weapons and not via conventional capabilities. And drones might as well be the central piece of the deterrence puzzle with their ability to effectively target economic and military infrastructure deep into the territory of any potential aggressor.
None of these arguments claims that nuclear weapons might not be effective as a deterrent threat (though there are more than enough arguments to doubt this claim according to scholars like John Mueller and Ward Wilson). However, deterrence by punishment via drones might be quite as effective, without the political, economic, and financial costs or the risk involved that the pursuit of nuclear weapons brings with it. The world might not get any more peaceful anytime soon. But if the right conclusions are drawn from recent conflicts, nuclear plenty might be the bullet we can dodge. Avoiding nuclear plenty by focusing on conventional drone deterrence would not only reduce the danger of nuclear escalation or the accidental use of nuclear weapons. Acknowledging the benefits of modern conventional deterrence in contrast to nuclear deterrence might be the way forward for Europe in times of a folding nuclear umbrella.
